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Introduction
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was born in Geneva on 28 June 1712. 
His mother died soon after his birth. His father, having a 
fight with an aristocrat, left Geneva for exile when J. J. 
Rousseau was ten years old. His maternal uncle, Gabriel
Bernard, took care of him and put him in a "pension" in the 
house of Pastor Lambercier at Bossey where he received for the 
first time a formal education. For a time he was happy in the 
simplicity of country life, but one day he was unjustly 
accused of breaking a comb. Concerning the encounter with the 
first injustice in his life, Rousseau remarks in his
Con f e s s i on s : "La fut le terme de la serenite de ma vie
enfantine. Des ce moment je cessai de jouir d ' un bonheur pur, 
et je sens aujourdui meme que le souvenir des charmes de mon 
enfance s'arrete la" (O.C., I, 20).
At that moment, Rousseau was not able to understand that
he was a victim of appearance. Later he became very aware of
the difference between being (I'etre) and appearing (le
para'itre), or in Jean S t ar ob insk i ' s concise word, between 
"etre-innocent" and "par a^ tre-coupable."l Concerning this 
event, Rousseau writes in his Confessions :
Ce premier sentiment de la violence et de I'injustice 
est reste si profondement grave'' dans mon ame , que 
toutes les idees qui s'y rapportent me rendent ma
premiere emotion; et ce sentiment, relatif a moi dans
son origins, a pris une telle consistence en lui-meme, 
et s'est tellement detache de tout interest personnel.
2que mon coeur s'enflamme au spectacle ou au recit de 
toute action injuste, quel q u 'en soit I'objet et en 
quelque lieu qu'elle se commette, comme si I'effet en 
retomboit sur moi. (O.C., I, 20)
Due to this episode, Rousseau returned to Geneva to the 
house of his uncle, who expected Rousseau to serve an 
apprenticeship in preparation for a career. But Rousseau 
passed from one job to another, employed at various times as 
an apprentice engraver, a servant, a tutor, an interpreter, 
and a secretary.
At Venice where he worked as a secretary of the French 
Embassy, Rousseau recalls that he was treated by the 
ambassador as a servant rather than as an office-holder. 
Because of this kind of treatment, he had a quarrel with the 
ambassador and was obliged to leave the post.2 relation to
this episode, Rousseau writes:
La justice et I'inutilite de mes plaintes me laisserent
dans 1'ame un germe d 'indignation contre nos sotes 
institutions civiles ou le vrai bien public et la 
veritable justice sont toujours sacrifles a je ne sais
quel ordre apparent, destructif en effet de tout ordre, 
et qui ne fait qu'ajouter la sanction de I'autorite 
publique a I'oppression du foible et a I'iniquite du 
fort. (Conf ess ions. O.C., I, 327)
These experiences of humiliation, maltreatment and 
economic dependency that he encountered in his life made him 
see political problems and solutions from the people's 
perspective. For Rousseau, more than for other philosophes, 
the concept of freedom and the concept of equality become two 
sides of the same coin. "La liberte," says Rousseau in his 
Le 11 r e s ec r i t e s d e 1 a Montagne, "consiste moins a faire sa
3problem to be solved becomes; how can one be free and
Independent from the will of others within a society? The 
only solution, for him, is to find an association where the 
law can be put above man, and where men can obey nothing but 
the law. According to Rousseau, it is only under this 
condition of association that people can be both free and 
equal, ruler and ruled.
The main purpose of our thesis is to examine the unity of
Rousseau's political theory through his concepts of
sovereignty, general will, representation, and natural law.
To this end, we found it useful to begin with the general
view of his philosophy and political thinking which is the 
subject of our first chapter. Here, we will try to show that
his philosophy could not be reduced either to pure 
sentimentalism or pure rationalism and his political theory 
either to pure individualism or pure collectivism. In relation 
to his political writings, in order to determine the source of
misunderstanding, we will make a distinction between the 
doctrine level and the system of realization level that must
be made in every social science. Another source of 
misunderstanding which will be mentioned is the use of 
terminology and Rousseau's awareness of the difficulty of 
using common words to express new ideas.
volonte q u 'a n'etre pas soumis a celle d'autrui; elle consiste
encore a ne pas soumettre la volonte d'autrui a la notre"
(O.C., 111> 841). Consequently, for Rousseau the political
Chapter two will concern the difference between the form
of sovereignty and the forms of government that reflects the
4distinction between the doctrine level and the system of 
realization level. Here, we will show that Rousseau, at the 
doctrine level, stands for democracy against the two extreme 
positions of despotism and anarchism; at the system of
realization level, he stands for an elective aristocratic 
government against democracy and monarchy.
Chapter three will treat the general will in its essence 
and its realization or manifestation through the majority 
vote. Here, we will show that, if the distinction between the 
two levels is kept in mind and if a balance is maintained 
between the will of the sovereign people and the force of 
government, there is no danger of totalitarianism in
Rousseau's political system.
Chapter four explores the idea of political
representation. We will try to show that, even Rousseau, given 
the large size of some countries, accepts representative 
democracy at the practical level, although the idea of
participation remains his idee directrice at the principle 
level .
Chapter five will deal with Rousseau's concept of natural 
law. Here, we will argue that Rousseau does not reject natural 
law theory as such; on the contrary, by making a distinction 
between natural law in the state of nature and in civil 
society, he reconciles the two extreme positions of the
ancients and the moderns.
5In all of these, our 
Rousseau's political system 
that his political thinking,
main goal is not to present 
as true and right, but to show
if it is understood in context.
Notes to Introduction
Jean Starobinski, Jean—Jacques Rousseau: la
transparence et I ’obstacle (Paris: Gallimard, 1971),
2 Maurice Cranston, Jean-Jacques ; the Early Life 
Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1754 (New York:
p . 19.
and
Norton,
1983), pp. 169-192.
Chapter I
Paradoxes or Misunderstandings
Since the problem of the unity of Rousseau's thought and 
his philosophy is at the center of much debate and the source 
of many misunderstandings, it is useful to make some comment 
on these before entering into our specific subject. To try to 
understand Rousseau's philosophy through the duallstic world 
view of the Modern Age and the Aristotelian logic of 
opposition and identity always ends in labeling him as an 
extremist in his philosophy as in his political theory. But 
the truth is that Rousseau always tried to hold the balance 
between two extreme positions, between sentimentalism and 
rationalism, individualism and collectivism, despotism and 
anarchism, monarchy and democracy. On the basis of such
evidence, we think that Rousseau had sufficient reason to
speak sometimes about his critics as his enemies, as his 
detractors on one hand, and to reiterate the unity and 
continuity of his thought on the other. In fact, in his 
Lettre a Christophe de Beaumont (1762), Rousseau explicitly 
and definitively expresses his idea on this subject matter: 
"J'ai ecrit sur divers sujets, mais toujours dans les memes 
prlncipes: toujours la meme morale, la meme croyance, les
memes maximes, et si 1'on veut, les memes opinions" (O.C., IV,
928) .
8In this respect, what Leszek Kolakowski says concerning 
Edmund Husserl's phenomenology as an attempt to save "European 
culture from skeptical decay,"1 can be applied, by analogy, to 
Rousseau's case. The principal aim of Husserl's philosophy was 
the search for "the absolutely unquestionable foundation of 
knowledge" against any kind of relativism and skepticisra."2 
Kolakowski writes that "Bergson was probably right in saying 
that every philosopher [in this case E. Husserl] in his life 
says only one thing, one leading idea or intention that endows 
all his works with meaning,"3 This remark fits appropriately 
with Rousseau's case and claim, because his ideas start from 
"a sudden illumination" that happened to him at the "Bois de 
Vincennes" on his way to visit Denis Diderot in 1749. In his 
Lettre a Malesherbes (1762), Rousseau writes:
J'allois voir Diderot alors prisonnier a Vincennes; 
j'avois dans ma poche un Mercure de France que je me
mis a feuilleter le long du chemin. Je tombe sur la
question de I'Academie de Dijon qui a donne lieu a mon 
premier ecrit. Si jamais quelque chose a ressemble a 
une inspiration subite, c'est le mouvement qui se fit
en moi a cette lecture; tout a coup je me sens I'esprit 
ebloili de mille lumieres; des foules d'ide'es vives s'y 
presenterent a la fois avec une force et une confusion 
qui me jetta dans un trouble inexprimab1e . . . . Oh
Monsieur si j'avois jamais pu ecrire le quart de ce que 
j'ai vu et senti sous cet arbre, avec clarte^ j'aurois
fait voir toutes les contradictions du systeme social,
avec quelle force j'aurais expose tous les abus de nos
institutions, avec quelle simpliclte j'aurois demontre 
que 1'homme est bon nature11ement et que c'est par ces 
institutions seules que les hommes deviennent mechans. 
(O.C., I, 1135-1136)4
Believing that the goodness of natural man is corrupted by the
abuses of our institutions, Rousseau had one goal in mind, to
solve the problem of political society by laying individuality
9and communality on common ground. To this end, Rousseau in his 
political philosophy, begins, not from initial chaos,5 but 
from a situation in which individual being (1* amour de soi) 
and species being (la pltle naturelle) are indissolubly united 
in such a way that a human being is both Individual and 
communal. This idea, of course, is sheer nonsense if we try to 
understand it through Aristotelian logic that proceeds by 
exclusion, and also through Hegelian dialectic that moves from 
thesis to antithesis to synthesis, and again to thesis, etc.6 
Because Rousseau denies the opposition between individuality 
and sociability at the ontological level, in order to 
understand Rousseau's idea, we need a specific methodology 
that can explain, not the relation and solution of contraries, 
but the co-presence of two terms or parties Indissolubly 
related to one another and at the same time maintaining their 
distinction. This kind of methodology can be found in the 
objective idealism of Michele F. Sciacca, an Italian
philosopher of this century. Sciacca in his philosophy uses a 
specific methodology which he calls 1a dialettica
d e l l 'impllcanza _e della compresenza. This methodology, in
Sciacca's word, "afferma senza escludere ed oppone senza 
risolvere 1'un termlne nell'altro ma afferma ed oppone 
inc1udendo".7 This kind of methodology can help us to 
comprehend Rousseau's intermediary position between two 
extreme theses. Rousseau, at the ontological level, does not 
start from two antithetical terms or contraries, but from two 
CO— present terms (dual unity) mutually necessary to one 
another beyond the logic of exclusion and the logic of ideal
synthesis of contraries.
10
On this basis, we can see that the
difficulty of understanding Rousseau's philosophy in general 
and his political theory in particular does not come from his 
ontology that deals with the nature of things, but from the 
weakness of his epistemology that deals with the knowable 
about things and the lack of specifc methodology appropriate 
to his ontology. Once the dichotomy between individual and 
society is commonly accepted as the point of departure to any 
future political philosophy, it was difficult to challenge the
dominant Aristotelian logic of his time. Besides, what does 
not facilitate the understanding of Rousseau's philosophy is 
that his ontology, contrary to that of others, is laid on the
predominance of sentiment, conscience, and heart over reason.8 
This, on one hand, complicates the relation between sentiment
and reason, and on the other, marks Rousseau's original 
contribution to philosophy and theology. In Emi1e , Rousseau 
states:
Je sais seulement que la verlte est dans les choses et 
non pas dans mon esprit qui les juge, et que moins je 
mets du mien dans les jugemens que j 'en porte, plus je 
suis sur d'approcher de la verlte; ainsi ma regie de me 
livrer au sentiment plus q u 'a la raison est confirmee 
par la raison m e m e . (O.C., IV, 573)
Here, he does not 
realism, except his
with reason. However, 
justice vient de Dleu, 
savions la recevoir 
gouvernement ni de
seem to differ much from ontological 
is based on sentiment in collaboration 
in Du Contrat social, he writes: "Toute
lui seul en est la source; mais si nous
de si haut nous n'aurions besoin ni de
loix" (O.C., III, 378). From the
corabination of
1 1
these two passages, we can see that Rousseau 
recognizes the limit of reason, contrary to many philosophes
of the Enlightenment, in explaining the richness of what he 
feels about the reality in his sentiment and conscience. In 
this, Derathe has reason to consider Rousseau as a 
"rationalist aware of the limits of r eason."9 This means that 
Rousseau acknowledges the limit of reason, but he is not 
against reason as an instrument of the enlightenment of what
every person is supposed to feel deeply inside him; on the 
other hand, however, he is against reason in the sense that it 
becomes an instrument of passions, of amour-propre; because 
this later reason, once separated from ontology, risks 
becoming an independent principle instead of remaining an 
indispensable light for conscience. Therefore, Rousseau's 
fear was not of reason in itself, but of reason in its 
alliance with amour-propre.
Concerning the relation between conscience and reason, 
Rousseau says in Emile: "La raison seule nous apprend a
connoitre le bien et le mal. La conscience qui nous fait
aimer 1 ' un et ha'ir I'autre, quoiqu ' independante de la raison, 
ne peut done se developper sans elle" (O.C., IV, 288). Jean
Lacroix comments on this passage;
Si la conscience est sentiment, il ne s'ensuit pas que 
tout sentiment I'exprime. II y a la sensibilite 
positive qui derive de 1'amour de soi, et la 
sensibilite negative issue de 1'amour-propre. La 
conscience est sensibilite positive. Mais en elle-meme 
elle n'est pas connaissance: elle est amour d 'un bien
qu'elle ignore. Des que la raison le lui revele, elle 
le desire. . . .  La conscience ne nous dit pas la 
verite des choses mais la regie de nos actions: non ce
1 2
qu'il faut penser, mais ce qu'il faut faire. Seulement, 
pour savoir ce qu'il faut faire, il faut connaitre ce 
qu'on doit penser: La conscience- sentiment a besoin de
la conscience-raison.10
Therefore, Rousseau makes a clear distinction between loving 
good and hating evil that depends upon conscience, and knowing 
good and evil that depends upon reason. Since we do not have 
innate knowledge of good and evil and knowing them does not 
mean, necessarily loving or hating them, according to Rousseau 
the interaction between reason and conscience is indispensable 
for man as moral agent. "Connoitre le bien," says Rousseau in 
Emi1e . "ce n'est pas I'aimer, 1'homme n'en a pas la
connoissance innee; mais sitot que sa raison le lui fait 
connoitre, sa conscience le porte a I'aimer: c'est ce
sentiment qui est inne" (O.C., IV, 600). 1 1 Here, it is obvious 
that our focus must not be on the conflict between reason and 
conscience, but on their interaction and their proper realms. 
In order to clarify this relation and avoid the ambiguity 
involved in the concept of reason, we must keep in mind the 
distinction between "two concepts of reason" as historically 
and conceptually explained by I. Fetscher:
The reason that serves the passions corresponds to the
modern mechanistic conception, as represented, for 
example, by David Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature 
where he actually says : "Reason is and ought only to
be the slave of the passions and can never pretend to 
any other office than to serve and obey them." On the
other hand, the conception of reason as a perception of 
the "order of things"— or,in other words, subjective 
reason directed toward the objectively and absolutely 
rational— goes back to the older tradition shared by 
the Christian and the classical worlds, which Rousseau 
came to know via the school of M a 1ebranche.12
1 3
These two reasons, in Jean Lacroix's words, can be called 
"la raison discursive" and "la raison intuitive." Rousseau 
explains:
L'art de raisonner n'est point la raison, souvent il en 
est I'abus. La raison est la faculte d'ordonner toutes 
les facultes de notre ame convenab1ement a la nature de 
choses et a leurs raports avec nous. Le raisonnement
est l'art de comparer les verite's connues pour en 
composer d'autres verites q u 'on Ignoroit et que cet art 
nous fait decouvrlr. Mais 11 ne nous apprend point a
connaitre ces verites primitives qul servent d'element 
aux autres, et quand a leur place nous mettons nos
opinions, nos passions, nos prejuge^’s, loin de nous
eclalrer il nous aveugle, 11 n'eleve point 1'a m e , il
I'enerve et corrompt le Jugement qu'il devroit 
perfectionner. (O.C., IV, 1090)13
Once again, Rousseau is not speaking against the intuitive 
reason that permits him to discover the first truths but 
criticizing discursive reason, especially, when it takes as
its premise the opinions, prejudices, passions that could 
arbitrarily differ from one person to another. In this 
context, we can see that limited descriptions of Rousseau as
ant 1-inte11ectualist, anti-rational1s t , and pure
sentimentalist are unjustified. Truth to tell, Rousseau is 
neither rationalist tout court nor sentimentalist tout court .
because his sentimentalism is tempered by his reason as well
as his rationalism by his sentiment. Ernest H. Wright is 
correct in saying: "We are not going to argue that Rousseau is
a rationalist; he is nothing quite so simple. We have failed
only if he still appears a rag of sentimentalism."!^ To
understand the relation between reason and sentiment in 
Rousseau's philosophy is also one step in understanding his 
concept of general will which is " 1 'union de I'^entendement et 
de la volonte" (O.C., III, 380). 15
As in the concept of reason, we must distinguish also
between two concepts of sentiment. In his book entitled The 
Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. E. Cassirer writes:
Rousseau's terminology designates with a single 
expression the two fundamentally different dimensions 
into which feeling enters. The word sent iment bears now 
a purely naturalistic, now an idealistic stamp; it is 
sometimes used in the sense of mere sentiment
(Empfindung) . sometimes in the sense of Judgment and 
ethical decision. One must pay careful attention to 
this double meaning, which, as a matter of fact, 
appears to have hardly ever been noticed by writers on 
Rousseau; for, if this double meaning is Ignored, the 
tortuous threads of Rousseau's doctrine threaten to 
become tangled up again and again. At times, feeling 
(sent iment) is for Rousseau a mere psychological 
affect; at times, it is a characteristic and essential 
action of the soul.
If we take the first meaning as Rousseau's only genuine 
sentiment, we reduce him to pure sentimentalist and
sensualist. As a result, our understanding of his concept of 
reason and of the general will is impaired. The approach to 
his thought or insight through either/or argument has caused 
the split of his philosophy into sentimentalism and
rationalism on the basis of heart-reason dichotomy, his 
political philosophy into individualism and collectivism and 
his works into earlier and later. On the contrary, Rousseau 
always stood for an intermediary position between two extreme
t h e s e s . In relation to this, we can remark that Rousseau was
radical concerning principles,
1 5
but he was moderate at a 
practical level. Even in this as often he was misunderstood by 
many revolutionaries from both sides who claim his ideas as a 
guide to their actions or a basis for their terrors.
To sum up, not starting from original chaos, but from 
ontological unity, what Rousseau tried to do was to 
reestablish the primitive synthesis— disrupted by the
corruption of society— by transforming its source from the 
instinctual level to the rational level and at the same time
by keeping its end which is the self-preservation and respect
of others' life and good. Rousseau says in Du Contrat social; 
"Le traite social a pour fin la conservation des contractans"
(O.C., III, 376). 17 It is very Important to insist again on
his philosophy, because in his political system, the dichotomy 
between the individual and society reflects not Rousseau's 
ontology of human essence but the empirical or historical 
existence of man in a civil society. This is not because of 
his nature, but of the nature of the society in which he 
lives; accordingly his salvation must come to him from 
political institutions. This is why Rousseau considers ethics
and politics as two terms dialectically related, and why also 
he makes appeal to the Lawgiver since the constitution is the 
key to good society. If we take this empirical dichotomy for 
the ontological one, Rousseau hardly differs from Hobbes who
denies that man is by nature sociable. If we translate the
passage of mankind from the state of nature into civil society
as a sudden passage, against man's nature, from individuality
to sociability, we misapprehend the importance of Rousseau's
evolutionary theory of humankind. In Rousseau, the relation
between the state of nature and civil society is 
chronologically sequential; on the contrary, the relation 
between the Individual and society is ontologically 
simultaneous. By isolating a passage from Emi1e (O .C .,III,600) 
and not taking into consideration the ontological relation 
between the individual and society, P. Benichou sees a
contradiction in Rousseau's thought: "Car 1'homme, nous dlt
Rousseau qui oublle son systeme, est 'sociable par sa nature'; 
11 est vrai qu'll se reprend aussltot et ajoute 'ou du moins 
fait pour le devenir.'"18 Rousseau's political solution aims 
to create a new and legitimate association that reflects 
human nature, respects its natural development, and allows man 
to live at peace with himself and with other men. According to
Hobbes and Locke, man enters into civil society purely to
escape the state of nature in order to secure his life or 
property; according to Rousseau, man enters into social
contract in order to overcome his alienated condition in civil 
society. Therefore, the real conflict, for Rousseau, is 
between the goodness of human nature and the corrupted 
soclety.
Rousseau's approach to political philosophy, not being 
one-sided, at least theoretically, can avoid a philosophical 
dilemma stated by J.M. Bochenski:
This is . . . the philosophical antinomy which forms
the background for the state in which mankind finds 
itself today. What is real: man or society? What
should be sacrificed for what? What is the end and what
17
are the means— the whole or the individual? Are 
concentration camps, in which millions of men suffer 
endlessly and die, justified because they are useful
for society, or should we say that, with respect to us, 
society has no rights at all; that taxes, military 
service, traffic laws are all morally unjustified, that
we have no duties to a fiction called the state?19
For the adherents .of the primacy of right over law, this 
antinomy is a crucial point, because in the last analysis, it 
leads us to the irrecone 11iab1e polarity of the rights of the 
individual versus the rights of society.
As his philosophy was reduced either to sentimentalism or 
to rationalism, his political thinking was reduced either to 
individualism or to collectivism . In his book entitled The 
Party of Humanity, Peter Gay summarizes very well these
conflicting interpretations: "In this arena of interpretation,
four Rousseaus were set to battle against one another: the
individualist, the collectivist, the confused, self­
contradictory, and curiously combining these three, the 
individualist who shifted in mid-career to co11ectivism."20 
C. E. Vaughan writes that "the political work of Rousseau, 
when taken as a whole, presents an unbroken movement from one 
position almost to its opposite."21 These two opposite 
positions, according to Vaughan, are founded in a discrepancy 
that exists between Rousseau's earlier writing (such as the 
two Pi scourses . where he "asserts the freedom of the 
individual, but of an individual divorced from all communion—  
it is hardly too much to say, from all connection— with his
kind") and his later works (such as the Contrat social and the
18
Economie Politique , where he "reverses the process, and exalts
the claims of the community to utter 'annihilation* of 
individual interests and rights").22 Rousseau himself
rejects the existence of this discrepancy between his earlier
and later works, as he writes in his Confessions : " Tout ce
qu'il y a de hardi dans le Contrat social etoit auparavant 
dans le Dlscours sur I'inegalite""; tout ce qu'il y a de hardi 
dans 1'Emi1e etoit auparavant dans la Julie" (O.C., I, 407).23 
In order to be convinced of Rousseau's claim about the unity 
and continuity of his ideas, at least, between the Pi scours 
sur I'inegalite and Du Contrat social, it is important to read 
carefully the Dedicace and the passage where he speaks about 
the research to be done concerning "la nature du pacte 
fondamental de tout Gouvernement," in his Pi scours sur 
1 * inegalite.24 on this specific subject, Paul Benichou 
confirms Rousseau's claim:
Le Contrat social est la veritable suite du Pi scours 
sur 1'inegali t e . dont il paracheve la dlalectique dans 
le sens d 'une reforme de I'ordre civilise. D'ailleurs 
le Contrat s'artlcule 1ittera1ement, et non pas 
seulement logiquement, sur le Discours. puisque ce 
nouvel ouvrage est annonce dans le Dlscours m ^ m e , a 
I'endroit ou 11 y est question de la nalssance des 
premieres societes.23
Now, if Rousseau's reiterated claim is true, do these 
contradicting interpretations and accusations come really from 
the understanding of Rousseau's text, or from an approach to 
his text through preconceived theories in terms of which it is 
Interpreted? Do not the inherent limitations in our
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This does not mean, however, that Rousseau's texts are
problem— free and he has not a taste for paradoxical
expression. Even so, our attention must be focused upon
avoiding the great mistake which is to take Rousseau's
paradoxical expression for a real paradox, in the sense of
contradiction, inherent in human nature. This is clearly
stated by Felicity Baker in La Route contraire; "les paradoxes
de Rousseau ne postulent nullement un 'homme paradoxal
comparable a celui du Pascal. C'est I'e^'crivain qui se fait
✓paradoxal afin de communiquer la vision d 'une humanite sans 
conflits. Nous avons dit que ce n'est point pour choquer la
raison des lecteurs qu'il se fait paradoxal."26 This, of 
course, does not remove all sources of misunderstanding, 
because Rousseau not only uses ordinary terms to mean 
different things, but seems to combine two principles, namely
the social contract27 and the general will28^ which are 
supposed to belong to two separate political paradigms, based 
on different ontological categories. The contrast between 
these two schools, for our purpose, can be better exemplified 
by John Locke's liberalism, which is based on the ontological 
premise of the primacy of the individual, and by Hegel's 
collectivism, which is based on the ontological premise of the 
community. Locke, starting from the primacy of the individual, 
reduces the role of political society to an instrument of 
safeguarding natural rights and securing private property.
methodology complicate the task of comprehending the world or
a given text in general, and Rousseau's political ideas in
part icular?
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On the contrary, Hegel, giving the ontological primacy to the 
community, views the individual man as "a dialectical moment
of society and nothing more. ”29 these two dominant
political postulates, the relation between individual and 
political society is understood in terms of subordination, not 
of coordination; individua1-socia1 split at a premise level
and their relation in terms of subordination is at the source
of a tension within man himself between his individual and his 
social dimension, a tension of which Rousseau was very well 
aware. Rousseau tried to heal the split in his Du Contrat 
social in which he is committed to "find a common foundation
or ground for both individual freedom and the community."30 
Rousseau was far ahead of his time in seeing and going beyond 
the institutionalized conflict due to these two opposed 
political postulates. For Rousseau, starting from a primitive
synthesis of man as individual-being (self-love, self 
affirmation) and species-being (pity, self expansion),31 the 
individual and the social could not be two different entities,
but two sides or aspects of the same reality which is man. For
Rousseau, the individua1-socia1 split within man himself does
not come from his essence, but from his history, i.e. from the 
fall of man. This Initial synthesis makes Rousseau differ
from other individualists such as Hobbes and Locke. Therefore,
for Rousseau, even man as an individual, in the state of 
nature, was ^  facto separated from others; he was not
separated from them by his ontological nature.32 jn fact, 
Rousseau in his Lettre a M. Philopolis (i.e. Charles Bonnet
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1720-1793), clearly states that society was natural to human 
s p e c i e s :
/ /N'oubliez pa s > je vous prie, que selon moi la societe 
est naturelle a I'espece humaine comme la decrepitude a 
I'lndividu. . . .  Toute la difference est que I'etat de
vieillesse decoule de la seule nature de 1'homme et que
celui de societe^ decoule de la nature du genre humain, 
non pas immediatement . . .  mals seulement . . .  a 
I'alde de certaines circonstances exterieures qui 
pouvoient ^tre ou n'etre pas, ou du molns arriver 
plustot ou plustard, et par consequent accelerer ou 
ralentir le progres. (O.C., III, 232)
Here what Rousseau is saying is that the is £.ac t.Q absence of
society in the state of nature does not mean that society
is/was contrary to the nature of man, who had/has within him
latent potentialities--such as reason, language, imagination,
sociability--that were not yet developed, because, at least,
they were not necessary to his conservation; these 
potentialities could be developed with the concurrence of 
some external circumstances. Then, for Rousseau, as H. Gouhier 
points o u t :
La contingence metaphisique de I'histoire ne permet pas 
1'alternative; etat de nature ou etat historique. Une 
necessite^ de fait condamne ”1 'homme selon la nature" a 
devenlr homme d e 1'h o m m e m a l s  I'homme devait — il
necessairement devenir celui-la meme qu'il est devenu 
en fait? Rousseau ne peut songer a un "retour a I'etat 
de nature": est-il pareillement oblige de maintenir le
status quo? La question qui se pose n'est done pas :
etat de nature ou histoire ? mais : cette histoire ou
une autre?33
Therefore, Rousseau's so-called primitivism in the Discours
sur 1 ' inegalite*'. instead of reflecting his real intention.
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rather tells us how he was misunderstood by his contemporaries 
and their followers and to what degree his contemporary 
critics were integrated to the society of their own time. 
Then, to interpret Rousseau through the dichotomy of state of 
nature versus society or history, not only is at the source of 
many contradictory questions, but also caused misapprehension 
of his very important conceptual frameworks such as the notion 
of primitive synthesis, of perfectibility, and especially, 
related to this, his "methode genetique”34 that permits him to 
"trace the gradual stages of man's psychological development 
from his original animal condition to the state of 
civilization.35 "it is only in the context of his genet i c 
concept of man," remarks Fetscher, "that we can . . . explain
Rousseau's position vis-a-vis Hobbes' thesis of the 'unsocial 
sociability' of man on the one hand and the classic doctrine 
of the social nature of man on the other."36 Then, Rousseau's 
so much misunderstood criticism of the progress of arts and 
sciences, i.e. of civilizations, was neither an invitation to 
return to the state of nature nor against progress in itself, 
but against its bad use and the consequences of its negative
effects on a man as species being, that estranged him from 
himself, his fellow man and nature.37
In passing, we can remark that even Rousseau's last book, 
Les Reveries du promeneur solitaire, should be interpreted not
by reducing its theme only to "Rousseau's separation from 
society and his break with the demands that society makes on
him"38 proof that he rejects his own political ideas, but
by seeing the Reveries as the reflections of a person aware of
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man's tragedy inasmuch as he is caught in existential tension,
because of the dichotomy (individua1-socia1, man-citizen, 
private-public) that led into the polarity of individualism
versus absolutism or collectivism concerning political 
theory.39 This brings to mind another mind-body split in 
Cartesian dualism that, in its turn, led many into idealism- 
materialism polarity as basic categories in understanding 
human nature and its problems. Although Rousseau did not 
convince his contemporaries that the scandal of the conflict
of civilized man with himself could be overcome, at least he
has the merit of formulating the real problem and Indicating 
the direction towards which to look for its r e s o 1 u t i on . 0
In a context in which the social contract theory and the
general will theory are taken as two mutually exclusive 
political postulates that justify political obligation on the 
basis of either self-interest or common interest, we can 
understand why these contradictory interpretations try to 
isolate in Rousseau's political text one genuine position 
based on the assumption that only one of the two contraries 
can be true. Otherwise, Rousseau is reproached for 
inconsistency or paradoxes, even of irrationality and madness.
In the world view dominated by a dualistic structure, Rousseau
is placed in the dilemma to opt either for the social contract
theory or for the general will theory, without any 
Intermediary option. From this point of view, we can 
understand further the logic behind, why his Interpreters also
are diveded about the relation between his different works and
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particularly about the role of the natural law in his 
political system. For some, Rousseau— however with some 
distinction— remains in the camp of the natural law theorists; 
and for others, he broke with the natural law tradition in 
favor of the general will theory by which he is, if not the 
father, the grand father of an authoritarian or a totalitarian 
r e g i m e . H e r e ,  the important point to mention is that 
Rousseau seems to be the innocent victim of the rivalry 
between the two dominant political premises of the modern age. 
In fact both schools suspect him of some kind of betrayal of 
their premises; the liberals do not forgive him, because of 
his general will theory, the collectivists because of his 
social contract theory.^2 other words, here, Rousseau is
accused of being irrational. His critics condemn him for
trying to maintain, at the same time, two contradictory 
positions which are supposed to be in flagrant violation of 
the Aristotelian logic of opposition and identity. But within 
this accusation and conflict, we think that Rousseau is
ne i ther a liberal tout court nor a collectivist tout court:
Instead he i s a "democrat", and being that, he could be a
1iberal, as will be shown later in chapter III.
On the bas i s of what has been said, we can make now a
tentative statement that many paradoxes attributed to 
Rousseau's text can be better explained and justified, at 
least partially, as a by-product of the collision between two 
self-consistent but diametrically opposed political principles 
based upon the individua1/society dichotomy. As much as these
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must study Rousseau, as every original thinker, through two 
phases. In the first phase, we need to make an effort to see
if his conclusions are or are not in harmony with his 
premises, and not with the premises of others. In the second 
phase, we must judge whether his premises are right or wrong, 
in the sense that his premises can explain better than other
premises the problems of humankind in the social and political 
aspects not only of his epoch, but also of ours. But, here our
study will be limited to the first phase.
One of the most common sources of misunderstanding comes
from not having a clear distinction in mind between two levels 
in political analysis and therefore not being able to 
distinguish clearly between premises and conclusions. These
two levels are: the doctrine or principle level and the system
of realization level or the practical level.^3 The first level
is concerned with the principle of political legitimacy and
the second with the realization of that principle through 
political institutions and organizations. This distinction is 
not only useful and valid; it was present in Rousseau's mind
as the structure of his Du Contrat social attests. The first
two books of Du Contrat social treat general principles and
the other two books the effectiveness and conservation of the 
same principles at the practical l e v e l . B y  applying this 
distinction to Rousseau's political writing, we will try to
two political premises continue to be the only point of
departure of political theory, Rousseau's political writings
are considered as paradoxes. To escape from this trap, we
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demonstrate consistency rather than inconsistency.
Related to this is another source of misunderstanding: 
the use of terminology, because the same term changes its 
meaning and real value when it is used in different levels and 
in different contexts. Above all, when every original thinker 
wants to communicate his intuition or his new theoretical 
discovery to an audience using ordinary words to express new 
ideas, he encounters a real problem of communication. This 
means that the same terms in his mind and in the mind of his 
audience often do not mean the same things. Therefore, to 
communicate thoroughly, it is not enough that each refers to 
his own subjective meanings, but rather to what Charles Taylor 
calls "intersubjectiVe meanings.”^5 The limitation and the 
insufficiency of language and logic as an exhaustive means of 
communication and expression was often felt by many
intuitlonists, because the intuition of which they speak and 
on which depends the whole meaning of logical conclusion is 
beyond either affirmation or negation of even well constructed
sentences. In this. Rou s seau was not an exception. In a
f ootnote to the Du Con t rat soc ial , he warns his reader s :
"Lecteurs a11 ent i f s , ne vous pressez pas , j e vous pr1e de
m 'accuser i d  de contradiction . Je n 'ai pu 1 ' eviter dans les
termes, vu la pauvrete de la langue" (O.C., H I ,  373). 
Rousseau realized that contradiction in words easily could be 
translated into contradiction in thought. At a crucial point, 
the original thinker's difficulty in communicating with an 
audience and the audience's in comprehending new ideas or
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visions, may result in an involuntary isolation on the part of
the thinker and a premature error in Judgment on the part of
the audience.
With these precautions in mind, we can now approach 
Rousseau's concepts of sovereignty, general will,
representation and natural law in our search for a consistency 
beyond the apparent paradoxes of his thought, a coherent unity
proclaimed by Rousseau himself in Du Contrat social; "Toutes 
mes idees se tiennent, mais Je ne saurois les exposer toutes a
la fois" (O.C., III, 377).
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Chapter II
Sovereignty versus Government
Rousseau was aware of his predecessors' and his con­
temporaries' inability to distinguish between the concept of 
sovereignty and government. In order to understand Rousseau's 
originality, we will maintain his implicit distinction between 
the form of sovereignty and the forms of government. The 
former refers to the doctrine level, and the later to the 
system of realization level. If these are not kept distinct, 
we can easily misapprehend the original contribution of 
Rousseau to political theory.
At the sovereignty level, Rousseau has no choice to make: 
democracy is the only legitimate form. Its two extremes, 
despotism (unity without diversity) and anarchism (diversity 
without unity) are the signs of the disintegration of the body 
p o l i t i c . A t  the government level, three forms are possible: 
democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.2 This classification of 
governments, as Emile Durkheim remarks, is made "according to 
the number of persons who participate in them."3
At the doctrine level, we have Rousseau's criterion 
(democracy) to discriminate the legitimate from the 
lllegitmate form of sovereignty, since, here, Rousseau is 
dealing only with the general principles that would be valid 
and legitimate whatever the circumstances. On the contrary.
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at the system of realization level, Rousseau has no a priori 
criterion to say that a specific form of government is better 
than the others, as Rousseau explains in Du Contrat social;
"On a de tous terns beaucoup dispute sur la meilleure forme de 
Gouvernement, sans consid/rer que chacune d'elles est la 
meilleure en certains cas, et la plre en d'autres" (O.C., III, 
403). Rousseau has, however, an a -posteriori criterion to 
prefer one form to another. Indeed, this preference is set 
forth in his Lettres ecrites de la Montagne:
Les diverses formes dont le Gouvernement est
/ Nsusceptible se reduisent a trois prlnclpales. Apres les 
avoir comparees par leurs avantages et par leurs 
Inconveniens, je donne la preference a celle qui est 
intermedialre entre les deux extremes, et qui porte le 
nom d 'Aristocratie. (O.C., III, 808)
Constantly maintaining this distinction, Rousseau clearly 
stated in Lettres ecrites de la Montagne that he was treating 
political science in a very original way;
Les fondemens de I'Etat sont les memes dans tous les 
Gouvernemens, et ces fondemens sont mieux poses dans 
mon Livre que dans aucun autre. Quand il s'aglt ensuite 
de comparer les diverses formes de Gouvernement, on ne 
peut evlter de peser separement les avantages et les 
inconveniens de chacun : c'est ce que je crois avoir
fait avec Impartlalite. (O.C., III, 811)
His new contribution to political theory becomes more 
explicit when Rousseau criticizes his precursors, especially, 
as he respectfully comments on Montesquieu's approach to the
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study of political principles in Emi1e by name and in Du 
Contrat social by allusion. " In this respect,” E. Cassirer 
remarks, "he [Rousseau] drew a sharp line between his own 
problem and the problems of the empirical sociologist. He 
reproaches even Montesquieu for not having gone back to the 
basic principles of law and for having been content to give a 
descriptive comparison of existing forms of law."4 Emi1e .
Rousseau writes:
Le seul moderne en etat de creer cette grande et 
inutile science [le droit politique] eut ete I'illustre 
Montesquieu. Mals 11 n'eut garde de tralter des 
prlncipes du droit politique; il se contenta de traiter 
du droit posltif des gouvernemens etablls, et rlen au 
monde n'est plus different que ces deux etudes. (O.C., 
IV, 836)
In Du Contrat social. he says:
Volla pourquoi un Auteur celebre a donne' la vertu pour 
prlnclpe a la Republique . . .  mais faute d'avoir fait 
les distinctions necessalres, ce beau genie a manque 
souvent de Justesse, quelquefois de clarte, et n'a pas 
vu que I'autorite Souveralne etant par tout la m e m e , le 
meme prlnclpe doit avoir lieu dans tout Etat bien
constltue, plus ou molns, il est vral, selon la forme 
du Gouvernement. (O.C., III, 405)
From these two passages, we can understand that Rousseau 
is dealing with the principle of political right, rather than 
with a descriptive comparison of positive laws of already 
established governments as Montesquieu and others had done, 
because, for Rousseau, the problem of political principle is
not the quest!on of facts and
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---    -- — of their relation via
comparison, but that of right. Therefore, as Rousseau 
indicates in his Lettre a M. le Marquis de Mirabeau (1767), 
the answer to the problem of sovereignty must be found either 
in his position, which stands for law above man, or in 
Hobbes', which stands for man above law:
Je ne vois point de milieu supportable entre la plus 
austere democratie et le hobbisme le plus parfait: car
le conflit des hommes et des lois, qui met dans I'Etat 
une guerre intestine continuelle, est le pire de tous 
les etats polltiques. ^
By this statement, Rousseau not only marks the boundary to be 
raised between democracy and arbitrary despotism, but also 
radically rejects the Physiocrats' position which is a 
"despot i sme legal." Rousseau reduces this latter position, 
highly respected among many philosophes . to "deux mots 
contradlctolres, qui reunls ne signlflent rien. . . .  "6
Concerning the forms of government at the system of 
realization level, in his Lettre a M. le Marquis de Mirabeau. 
Rousseau so clearly points out: "La science du gouvernement
n'est q u 'une science de combina1sons, d 'applIcations et 
d 'except ions, selon les temps, les lieux, les circonstances. 
Jamais le public ne peut voir avec evidence les rapports et le 
jeu de tout cela."7 Therefore, the criterion, abstractly 
speaking, for the best or the worst forms of government is 
related to many concrete factors such as time, size of
and of population, climates, and other contingent
circumstances. In add1t1on
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, i n h i s Le 11 r e s ecrltes de la 
Mon t agne. Rousseau defines the government In precise terms: 
” . . . le gouvernement • . . est un corps Intermedlalre
etabll entre les sujets et le Souveraln pour leur mutuelle 
correspondence, charge de I'executlon des Lolx et du malntlen 
de la Llberte, tant civile que politique" (O.C., III, 808).8 
Then, the concept and the necessity for government as 
Intermediary Is related to Rousseau's distinction between the 
people as sovereign and the people as subjects.
To sum up, the general distinction between the sphere of 
sovereignty and the sphere of government Is nicely and 
precisely stated In his Lettres ecrltes de la Montagne; "On 
dolt se souvenir Icl que la constitution de I'Etat et celle du 
Gouvernement sont deux choses tres dlstlnctes, et que je ne 
les al pas confondues. Le mellleur des Gouvernemens est 
1'ar1stocrat1q u e ; la plre des souveralnetes est
I'arlstocratlque" (O.C., III, 808-809).
One of Rousseau's original discoveries on this subject 
matter Is the clear distinction to be made between sovereignty 
and government. The concept of sovereignty, before him, 
denotes legislative and executive powers In the hands either 
of one person, of a few nobles, or of the whole people. 
Indeed, Derathe points out:
Avant Rousseau, les jurlstes et les ecrlvalns 
polltlques ne font . . . aucune difference entre le
gouvernement et la souveralnete. S'll en est alnsl, 
c'est tout d'abord parce que, pour eux, la puissance 
executive est une partle de la souveralnete au meme
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titre que la puissance legislative, ou d'autres droits 
comme le pouvoir judiciaire ou le droit de faire la 
guerre et la paix.9
For this very reason, Rousseau criticizes Montesquieu's 
political analysis as great and useless, because, not making a 
distinction between sovereignty and government, Montesquieu 
tried to identify and locate in each different form of 
government its proper principle such as virtue for democracy, 
moderation for aristocracy, honor for monarchy and fear for 
despotism. This kind of approach to political study led to the 
discussion about the best form of government by comparing them 
to each other. Rousseau, not recognizing any legitimate form 
of sovereignty other than popular sovereignty, can say against 
Montesquieu that virtue must be the principle of all
legitimate governments, and not limited to that of 
democracy. 10
For Rousseau, the essence of democracy, at the form of 
sovereignty level, consists in the subordination of the
executive power held by the different forms of government to 
the sovereignty of the people.11 On the condition that this 
relation of subordination could be maintained, at least 
theoretically, all forms of government are considered as 
democratic, consequently legitimate. For the same reason, as 
we shall see later, Rousseau was not in favor of democracy, at 
the form of government level, because at this precise point 
the relation of subordination between the sovereignty and the 
executive power becomes less.12 Even hypothetically speaking.
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when democracy at the sovereignty level and at the form of 
government level coincide de facto, they must remain always 
separated de .jure . as particular wills remain separated de 
-jure from the general will even in the case of unanimity.13 
The reason for this, at least one of the reasons, is explained 
by Derathe:
Sans doute il n'est pas impossible qu ' une volont^ 
particuliere solt d'accord avec la volonte generale, ou 
I'interet du prince avec celui de l*Etat, comme le 
soutiennent les jurisconsu1tes, mais cet accord, 
purement fortuit, ne saurait etre durable ni constant. 
II ' y 3 done que des i nc onven i en t s a vouloir
substltuer une volonte^ particuliere a la volont^
generale.1^
Besides, sovereignty and the government are separated in their 
sources. Sovereignty is instituted by the act of the social 
pact in unanimity basis and government is established by the 
ac t o f 1a w .13
To Illustrate better the distinction between sovereignty
and government, we will now refer to the concept of democracy
as the most explicit example. Rousseau does not present
democracy as the best form of government. In Du Contrat
social , he writes: "S'll y avoit un peuple de Dleux, il se
/gouverneroit Democratiquement. Un Gouvernement si parfalt ne 
convient pas a des hommes" (CS, O.C., III, 406). And, in a
Let t re _a Franco!s-Henri d 'Ivernoi s ( 1767), he adds: "Je ne
suls pas visionnaire, et dans le Contrat Social je n'al jamais
approuve le gouvernement D e m o c r a t ique.” 16 addition.
democracy at this level, sounds almost se1f-contradictory: "Un
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peuple qui gouverneroit toujours bien n'auroit pas besoln 
d ’etre gouverne" (CS, O.C., III, 404).
Therefore, according to Rousseau, democracy as a form of 
government in which it is difficult to discern sovereign from
magistrate, or sovereignty from government, would be reliable 
only to men as perfect as Gods, but since they are not: "il
n'y a pas de Gouvernement si sujet aux guerres civiles et aux 
agitations intestines que le Democratique ou populaire" (CS,
o.c., III , 405). In this specifc context , Rous s e a u '
af f i rmat ion, at the principle level, that "Tout Gouvernement
1eg1 time e s t republicain" [i.e. democratique] (CS , O.C. , III ,
380) , 17 and his assertion. at the system of real1zat ion
level , that "A prendre le terme dans la r igueur de
I'acception, il n'a Jamais existe de veritable Democratie, et 
il n'en existera jamais"(CS, O.C., H I ,  404) are not in 
contradiction, if and only if they are taken at their 
appropriate level.
On this subject, we can only misunderstand Rousseau's 
ideas, if we confuse the distinction made by him between 
sovereignty and government, legislative authority and 
executive power, and consequently their specific roles and 
relations. About the confusion made on this distinction by
his critics, Rousseau, in his Lettres ecrites de la Montagne. 
makes the following observations:
La constitution democratique a Jusqu'a present ete mal 
examinee. Tous ceux qui en ont parle, ou ne la 
conno1sso1ent pas, ou y prenoient trop peu d'interet, 
ou avoient interet de la presenter sous un faux Jour. 
Aucun d 'eux n'a sufflsamment distingue le Souverain du
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Gouvernement. II n'y a point d'Etat ou ces deux 
pouvolrs solent si separes, et ou 1'on ait tant affect^
de les confondre. Les uns s'imaginent q u 'une Democratie 
est un Gouvernement ou tout le Peuple est Magistrat et 
Juge. D'autres ne voyent la liberte que dans le droit 
d'elire ses chefs, et n'etant soumis q u 'a des Princes,
croyent que celui qui commande est toujours le 
Souverain. (O.C., III, 837-838)
And again he illustrates this distinction by comparing the 
monarchic system with the democratic one:
Dans les Monarchies ou la puissance executive est 
jointe a I'exercice de la souveralnete, le Gouvernement 
n'est autre chose que le Souverain lul-meme, aglssant
par ses Mlnistres, par son Conseil, ou par des Corps 
qui dependent absolument de sa volonte. Dans les 
Republlques, surtout dans les Democratles, ou le 
Souverain n'agit jamais immediatement par lul-meme, 
c'est autre chose. Le Gouvernement n'est alors que la
puissance executive, et 11 est absolument distinct de
la souveralnete. (L M , O.C., III, 770-771)
In Rousseau's political thinking, sovereignty and 
government differ also in their functions. The sovereign 
people has a function to legislate and government a function 
to apply existing laws to particular cases. Rousseau is very 
explicit in this matter:
Nous avons vu que la puissance legislative appartlent 
au peuple, et ne peut appartenlr q u 'a lui. II est aise 
de voir au contraire, par les principes ci-devant 
etablis, que la puissance executive ne peut appartenir 
a la generalite, comme Legislatrice ou Souveraine; 
parce que cette puissance ne conslste q u 'en des actes 
particuliers qui ne sont point du ressort de la loi, ni 
par consequent de celui du Souverain, dont tous les 
actes ne peuvent etre que des loix. (CS, O.C., III, 
395-396)
Within the context of this and this relation of
subordination of the executive power to the legislative power, 
we can see that there is no contract of submission (also 
called of government) between the people and the magistrates. 
So, Rousseau continues:
ceux qul pretendent que 
des chefs n'est
n'est absolument 
lequel, simples
son nom le pouvoir
i'll peu t 
reprendre quand il lul plait, 1
etant Incompatible avec la nature du corps
soumet 
ralson. Ce 
emploi dans 
exercent en 
depos1talres, et qu
dro i t
social, et contralre 
O.C., III, 396)
point un contract, ont grande 
q u 'une commission, un
du Souveraln, ils
dont il les a faits 
limiter, modifier et
'alienation d 'un tel
avec
au but de 1'associat1o n . (CS,
If the subordination of the executive power to the 
sovereign people is Rousseau's criterion of the genuine 
democracy, we could not understand Ellenburg's statement that 
"the form of legitimate government in every free state must be 
temporarily democratic on two occasions, when government is 
first established and when magisterial tenure is reviewed."18
Does this really mean that the form of legitimate government 
is not democratic except on these two occasions? If our 
understanding is right, Ellenburg's distinction between 
legitimate government and the form of legitimate government 
seems to conform to Rousseau's distinction between sovereignty 
and the forms of government. If this is the case, we can not
see a paradox between standing for democracy at the principle 
level and for elective aristocracy at the practical level.
Ellenburg says:
If the operation of legitimate government confirms 
Rousseau's anarchism in that such a government does not 
govern, there is nevertheless a paradox concerning the
form of legitimate government: Rousseau's demand for
literal self-government finds inexpedient a direct 
democracy and favors an aristocracy selected by lot.19
We think this paradox could come from the author's attempt to 
explain Rousseau's whole political system on the basis of the 
antithesis "between liberty and slavery," consequently between 
democracy and d e s p o t i s m . g y  insisting much on the dichotomy 
between liberty and slavery, Ellenburg finds it difficult to 
understand the idea of "legislator," "divided vote in a 
legislative assembly" and "punishment" in Rousseau's political
system, because logically he takes them as an obvious 
challenge to Rousseau's "egalitarian principle of political 
right," i-e. to se1f-government.21 And on the other hand, he 
excludes any concept of representation, because it confirms 
his concept of "egalitarian imperative." However, in Du 
Contrat social. Rousseau does not exclude, a direct democracy 
at the form of sovereignty level, but excludes representative 
democracy at this same level. And Rousseau prefers
aristocracy to democracy at the form of government level, in 
the sense of direct exercise of the executive power by the
entire people.
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Chapter III
The General Will versus Majority Rule
To understand the possible conflict between the general 
will and the majority rule, it is useful to clarify first the 
meaning of democracy in its relation to the concept of 
liberalism. The term democracy is ambiguous, because its true 
meaning depends on the context in which it is used. For our 
present purpose, the ambiguity of democracy comes from its 
association with the concept of liberalism. This association 
complicates our understanding of the sense in which Rousseau 
could be called democrat or liberal. As J. Salwayn Schapiro 
remarks in his book entitled Liberallsm; "Hitherto 
antithetical in their meaning, the terms 'liberalism* and 
'democracy* became interchangeable."! xo have some clear ideas 
about the relations implied between democracy and liberalism, 
and consequently to avoid a confusing frame of analysis, we 
find it useful to refer to the ideas of two authors of the 
twentieth century, namely George Santayana (1863-1952) and 
Yves R. Simon (1903-1961).
Santayana points out the danger of the commonly accepted 
association of liberalism with democracy that leads to the
doctrine of tyranny of the majority rule over minority in
whi ch the latter is subordinate to the former. To awaken us
from this association, he uses this shocking phrase, at least 
at first glance: "to be liberal is contrary to the genius of
d e m o cracy."2 For Santayana, democracy requires "the single 
mind and temper irresistibly swaying the whole people."3 This 
requirement is in total disagreement with the spirit of 
liberalism which is "individualistic, respectful towards 
things alien, new, or unknown; it welcomes diversity; it 
abhors compulsion; it distrusts custom.
On the basis of this distinction, Santayana draws an 
important observation that needs to be quoted at length:
It would be a violent tyranny to make majorities 
absolute if, in a democracy the majority and the 
minority were not much alike. To yield on a question of
procedure, of persons, of minor policy is easy for the 
minority; that minority is not thereby robbed of any 
fundamental liberty or outraged in any rooted habit. 
But to yield up one's soul, because the devil has a 
majority of one is not in human nature. Democracies
must either have a single soul— the minority being in 
agreement with the majority in every Important matter—  
or it must not touch the soul at all, but be Itself 
only a matter of procedure, a convenient form of 
government so long as government is of no great 
consequence.3
This distinction between democracy and liberalism enables 
us to understand the relation between the general will and 
majority rule in Rousseau's political framework. If we confuse
democracy with liberalism, there is a risk of cosidering the 
disagreement between majority and minority will as a clash of
pr inc i pies
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Instead of as a technical disagreement about the 
best way to realize and promote the common interest. This was
not a crucial problem in Rousseau's mind, because he was very 
well aware of it. Rousseau opposed Grotius on this matter, as
he states in Du Contrat social;
En effet, s'il n'y avoit point de convention 
anterieure, ou seroit, a molns que I'election ne fut 
unanime, I'obligation pour le petit nombre de se 
soumettre au cholx du grand, et d'ou cent qui veulent 
un maitre ont-ils le droit de voter pour dix qui n'en 
veulent point? La loi de la pluralite^ des suffrages est
elle-meme un etab1issement de convention, et suppose au
moins une fois I'unanimite. (O.C., III, 359)
In this context, the decision made by majority vote has
no validity unless it presupposes the existence of a previous 
unanimous agreement upon fundamental principles. Therefore, in 
Rousseau's political system, the relation between majority and 
minority creates less problem, because this difficulty is not
placed at the principle level, but at the political process 
level. For this reason, the accusation of the majority's 
tyranny over minority becomes a serious problem, if and only
if, by extrapolation we assume, as A. Cobban remarks that "the 
sovereignty of the general will means the sovereignty of the 
people, which in turn is equated to the tyranny of the 
majority."6 But Rousseau, as Cobban adds, was far from 
"identifying the will of the sovereign with that of the 
majority."7
Yves R. Simon, in his book entitled Philosophy of
Democrat ic Government. shows the subtle and indirect relation
between liberalism and democracy:
Liberalism, understood with philosophic thoroughness. 
Implies that principles themselves are thrown into the 
universal competition of opinions. Democracy does not 
imply liberalism, but it does demand a discussion of 
means freely conducted in all parts of society. In so 
far as it is impossible to trace a clear line between 
means to be deliberated on and ends or principles to be 
kept above deliberation, democracy implies a state of 
affairs in which accidents favorable to liberal 
attitudes and doctrines are likely to be more frequent 
than elsewhere. It would be inaccurate to speak of an 
essential connection between liberalism and democracy 
and equally inaccurate to deny that they are connected 
in some fashion.8
Therefore, for Simon, the real problem in democracy is
to assert principles in such a way as not to Jeopardize 
the free discussion of means, and to insure free 
discussion without jeopardizing the principles without 
which social life no longer has end or form. The risks 
proper to democratic practice demand that the assertion 
of principles be more profound, more vital, and more 
heartfelt than elsewhere. Unless this assertion is 
embodied in the living essence of community life, it 
will be nonexistent. Bureaucratic procedure cannot do a 
thing about it. A democratic society that loses its 
spirit is readily delivered to disintegration, for it 
no longer has any means of asserting its principles.9
If we keep in mind this distinction between liberalism 
and democracy, we can avoid accusing Rousseau of 
totalitarianism or anarchism on the basis of an either/or 
argument. It is not easy to label Rousseau either as 
collectivist or individualist, because he could be liberal and 
pragmatic concerning the discussion upon the best means of
reallzatlon and illiberal and democrat concerning the
principles
49
political right. In fact, he is a democrat, in 
the sense that in his political thinking sovereignty resides 
and remains in the hands of the people, whatever the form of 
government, and he is a liberal in the sense that he accepts 
decisions or laws passed by a majority of votes.10 Therefore, 
to accuse Rousseau of totalitarianism is to confuse his key 
concepts of sovereignty based on the general will and 
government based on force, in which the force of government is 
subordinate to the will of the sovereign people.
On the basis of these general remarks, we can now treat 
the source of misunderstanding between the general will at the 
principle level and at the realization system level that 
created so many contradictory questions and condamnations. 
This distinction is nothing other than the distinction of the 
general will between its essence and its manifestation as 
expressed in the popular assembly.
Rousseau, at the principle level, speaks about the 
general will, in its essence, as "always constant,” "always
right," "pure, unchanging," and general in its "purpose as 
well as in its nature." On the contrary, at the system of 
realization level, he speaks about the general will as 
determined by the expressed vote of the majority. Accordingly, 
at the principle level, Rousseau speaks of the general will as 
inalienable, indivisible and indestructible, but, at the 
system of realization level, he admits the conflict between
the general will and particular wills.
50
If the relation between majority and minority is placed 
in the social context where there is no common principle and 
Interest, it is obvious that their relation becomes a very 
serious problem. Chaim Perelman points out this problem in his 
article entitled “Rhetoric and Politics” :
In order for a democratic regime to function, that is, 
in order for a minority to accept the decision of the 
majority, after deliberation, the values common to all 
members of the community must be considered more 
fundamental than those which tend to separate it. 
Without these values, without the spiritual unity which 
the epideictic discourse properly reinforces, there is 
neither a majority nor a minority, rather two 
antagonistic groups which clash, where the strongest 
group dominates the weakest and where nothing counts 
except the power struggle.il
Then, if we interpret Rousseau's relation between minority and 
majority within the context of homogeneous society that has 
common value, we could lessen the problem concerning the 
general will as always right, always general in its source and 
its object in one hand, and the general will as expressed by 
majority votes. In fact, Rousseau explicitly says the subject 
of discussion by the assembled citizens is not about the 
rightness or the wrongness of the general will, but if the 
proposed laws conform with the general will or not:
Quand on propose une loi dans I'assemblee du Peuple, ce 
q u 'on leur demande n'est pas precisement s'ils 
approuvent la proposition ou s'ils la rejettent, mais 
si elle est conforme ou non a la volonte'’ generale qui 
est la leur; chacun en donnant son suffrage dit son 
avis la-dessus, et du calcul des volx se tire la 
declaration de la volonte generale. (CS, O.C., III, 
440-441)
5 1
This passage, to put it in Cassirer's judicious words,
"would seem to indicate that the content of the general will 
could be determined purely quantitatively, by the simple 
counting of individual votes."12 But, for Rousseau, the
content of the general will, at the principle level, is not an 
issue of the second chapter of book four of the Du Contrat 
social. Moreover, where Rousseau speaks about the general will 
at the principle level, he writes : "ce qui generalise la
volonte est moins le nombre des voix, que I'interet commun qui 
les unit" (CS, O.C., III, 374). What aggravates the problem is 
that the concept of the general will as determined by counting 
votes is preceded by the following passage:
Le citoyen consent a toutes les loix, meme a celles
q u 'on passe malgre lui, et meme a celles qui le 
punissent quand 11 ose en violer quelqu'une. La volonte
constante de tous les membres de I'Etat est la volonte
generale; c'est par elle qu'lls sont citoyens et 
libres. (CS, O.C., III, 440)
The difficulty in understanding these two passages concerning
the general will as constant and as determined by votes is
well formulated in Ellenburg's essay on Rousseau and Kant, 
where he writes: "A lot is at stake in the interpretation of
that familiar and obscure passage in the Social Contract where 
Rousseau, invoking the general will as the 'constant will' of 
all citizens, claimed that outvoted citizens have also 
consented to all laws."13 Richard Dagger, who has written a
very important article entitled
5 2
’'Understanding the General 
Will suggests a distinction between the and ji general will
in order to explain the relation between voting and the
general will. However, because this distinction is not 
clearly implicit in Rousseau's Du C o n t r a t social. Dagger
writes: "Rousseau's mysterious remarks about the relationship
between voting and the general will . . . have still to be
e x p l a i n e d 14. Margaret Canovan puts the difficulty this way: 
"majority decision does not fit comfortably at all into his
theory. After all, how can a defeated minority be said to be
free and ruled by their own laws when the measure they have
voted against passes over their opposition?"15
The first two authors, we believe, agree that the
pas sages quoted from Rousseau's Du Contrat social cannot be
interpreted as a confirmation of ma jor i t y rule, because, in
Rousseau's case, the majority can err in its Interpretation of 
the general will. For this reason, as Ellenburg pointed out, 
"Rousseau . . .  did not even attempt to defend a majority's
right to rule a minority. "16
Rousseau was aware that the problem of the divided vote 
in an assembly of the people concerning legislative matters, 
when it is taken out of its context, could be subject to 
question; consequently, in anticipation of his critics, he 
formulates himself the objection: "On demande comment un homme
peu t A .e t r e 1 i br e , et f o r c ^  de se c o n f o r m e r  a de s VO 1ont ^ s qu i
ne sont pas 1 e s siennes. Comm e n t les oppos an s s o n t- ils libres
e t soumi s a de s loix a u q u e l l e s i 1 s n 'ont pas c o n s e n t ! ? " ( C S ,
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O.C., III> 4A0). And immediately in the following paragraph, 
Rousseau answers: "Je reponds que la question est mal pos^e"
(CS, O.C., III, 440). Because, in Rousseau's political system, 
the separation between majority and minority at the principle 
level is nonsense. This distinction is admitted at the 
practical level either because of our limitation of knowledge 
or because of our selfish interest. The general will that 
guides and unites the people cannot be tied to numbers, but to 
what is the best for every citizen, therefore for each person. 
In this context, the counting of votes is taken as a sound 
sign that the majority opinion likely approximates the general 
will rather than that of the minority. J. H. Broome points out 
that Rousseau
considers voting, not in terms of absolute or 
wrongness, but in a perfectly reasonable and 
commonsense way, as the giving of estimates of the 
long-term interest of the community. This enables the 
community to exploit in its actions such probability- 
value as is vested in majority opinion; but it is also 
offers the great political advantage of holding open a
door to reconci1 iation.17
This means, the common Interest, in terms of ours and not of 
others, unites us with regard to the end and the necessary 
means. Rousseau says : "Qui veut la fin veut aussi les
moyens" (CS, O.C., III, 376). The divided vote in a 
legislative assembly does not deal with the end at the 
principle level. However, it does with regard to the plurality 
of the means to choose in order to reach this same end, which
"Ces moyens sont1 s the common interest. Rousseau adds:
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inseparables de quelques risques, meme de quelques pertes" 
(CS, O.C., III, 376). Therefore, this risk could not be 
remediated or acceptable if the members of the community were 
not in some way already united.18
Rousseau's acceptance of the majority decision at the 
expediency level, as an expression of the general will, is 
based simply on this assumption: "Cecl suppose, 11 est vral,
que tous les caracteres de la volonte general e sont encore
dans 1 a pluralite: quand 11 s cessent d'y etre. que1que parti
qu * on prenne il n'y a plus de liberte" (CS, 0. C, III, 441).
So, the minority is not asked to obey to or be bound by the 
will of the majority, i.e. the will of the others, but to 
consent to the general will that is the same for all, as 
interpreted and expressed by the counting of votes. In other 
words, the act of voting , at the practical level, did not 
bind the minority to the majority, but only to the general 
will of which both parties are members. The reason is that 
unanimity is only required for the creation of the social 
pact,19 but not for the everyday operation at the practical
level: "Hors ce contrat primitif," says Rousseau, "la voix du
plus grand nombre oblige toujours tous les autres; c'est une
suite du contract meme" (CS, O.C., III, 440). Then, the 
consent of the minority to laws passed by the majority is a
logical consequence of the nature of the contract.
The constant will of the members of the body politic is 
nothing other than the desire of citizens for the common 
Interest. Therefore, the minority does not differ
fundamentally from the majority concerning the ends, but 
concerning the most effective means of reaching the ends 
through appropriate and detailed laws. In this, John B. Noone 
is correct in pointing out that
assemblies are convened, not to debate ends, but to 
consider matters that might be adjudged threats to 
these ends, or to seek means of strengthening or 
furthering them, or to consider proposals that might 
enhance the common life without threatening ends. . . .
It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that
legislation concerns means and not ends. If legislation 
ordained ends, the contract would be abrogated in the 
same way as if sovereign legislation marked off a 
preditermined group within society.20
Then, the aim of the deliberating assembly consists in 
approving or disapproving the proposal of the best means that 
can translate into reality those ends, which are not in 
themselves parts of the regular assembly's discussion.
If and only if the disagreement between the majority and 
the minority is considered as taking place at the principle 
level. Instead of at the political process level, Rousseau's 
famous phrase, "qulconque refusera d'obeir a la volonte 
generale . . .  on le forcera d'etre libre" (CS, O.C., III, 
364), becomes Insult as well as injury.21 if and only if
Rousseau equates the general will with the majority will, the 
following analysis by A. Rustow could be irrefutable: "Instead
of warning the majority against any despotic abuse of its 
constitutional power, instead of appealing to the conscience 
of the majority, or reminding it of any eternal and universal
norms of natural law he [Rousseau] further
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s the
majority in its presumptuousness and obduracy. ' The general 
will . . . is always constant; unalterable and pure'. ' The
general will is always right'. . . ." 22 jf this were true,
Rousseau's totalitarianism would be the worst of its kind, 
because the tyranny of the majority taken as the total 
embodiment of the general will would be endowed with righteous
infallibility. In this case the minority would not be forgiven 
as mistaken, but crushed, excommunicated and persecuted as 
heretic and traitor. The consequences of such an
from subscribing to this premise and to its disastrous
associating the minority opnion with honest error rather than
malevolence or coruptlon, Rousseau continues to lay claim to
the loyalty of the defeated, and also, of course, remains 
faithful to his optimistic view of human nature."23
It is very important to note that Rousseau's concept of 
the general will, at least in Du Contrat social, is purposely 
and consciously limited to small city states based upon 
definite economic ideas. This means that the understanding of 
the general will must be within the context of homogeneous 
society, not of the heterogeneous society of our time which 
complicates understanding the relation between minority and 
majority, and within them between active and passive; a 
society based upon different values and irreconcilable
are incalculable. Fortunately, Rousseau is far
consequences. On the contrary, as Broome pointed out: "In
principles where the struggle for power, rather than shared
common values become s rule. In this, Cobban has reason to
warn Rousseau's readers:
We must . . .  take him quite seriouly when in the
Contrat social he limits his ideal state to a single 
city and when he complains that he has written only for
his native city and similar small states, that he did
not dream of reforming the great states of Europe, but
only of checking the corruption of those which still
retained their original size and something of their 
primitive simplicity.
We have constantly to keep in mind the distinction
between the world for which Rousseau wrote and that in
which we read him. . . .  He is all along thinking of 
the small, simply organized, conservative state, where
the inhabitants live as their fathers have lived, and 
where, once the constitution has been established, the
passing of new laws would be a very rare event.24
If we pay attention to Cobban's warning and Rousseau's
general assumptions, there is no danger that the discussion on
the proposals by the sovereign people could be reduced to a 
simple technique of manipulation in the hand of the executive
power, because the laws as expression of the general will 
arise out of the shared common goals and values.
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Chapter IV
Participatory Democracy versus Representative Democracy
In general, the term "representation" is ambiguous, and 
its use without qualification leads to more confusion rather 
than to clarification. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, after she 
enumerated many terms used to express the true role of the 
representative, gives two main types of representation, and 
within them other variants:
The theoretical discussions in which such terms are 
Invoked tend to fall into a basic pattern of 
polarization concerning the representative's role, 
which I have called the "mandate-independence" 
controversy. The controversy might be summarized in 
some such dichotomous choice as: Should (must) a
representative do what his constituents want, or what 
he thinks best? On the one side are those writers who
stress the popular mandate given to a representative by
those for whom he acts, his obligation to do what they 
expect of him, to act as if they were acting 
themselves. On the other side are those who maintain 
that the representative must act independently, on his 
own judgment, that he is selected precisely for his 
special abilities, and that his job is to adapt and 
enlarge the constituents' special, separate needs into 
the national welfare.!
Rousseau in the Contrat social is against any 
representation concerning legislative power: "Les Deputes du
peuple ne sont . • . ni ne peuvent etre ses representans, lis 
ne sont que ses commissaires; ils ne peuvent rien conclure 
definit1vement. Toute loi que le Peuple en personne n'a pas 
ratifiee est nulle; ce n'est point une loi" (O.C., III, 429— 
430). However in his Considerations sur le gouvernement de
Po1ogne Rousseau seems to accept the "mandate" version of 
representation, when the will of the people is expressed in 
election or in consultation, but the "independence" version in 
subject matters not forseen by the people. For our present 
purpose, we will use the terms "representative as delegate," 
because this translates well Rousseau's concept of deputy, and 
"representative as trustee,"' because Locke, the champion of 
the representative government, uses it.
Furthermore, the term "representation" is ambivalent in 
Rousseau's Du Con t rat social. because he uses it negatively 
concerning sovereignty and positively concerning government. 
This means he accepts representative government at the 
practical level but rejects representative democracy at the 
principle level, in the sense that the sovereignty of the 
people, which is the exercise of the general will, could be 
transferable to the representatives. For this reason, in
Rousseau's political context, it is appropriate to speak about 
the problem of representative democracy rather than
representative government. As J.G. Merqulor correctly points 
out; "contrary to the current impression, Rousseau was not 
against representative government; what he refused, in bk III, 
ch. XV of the Social Contract, was just the representation of 
sovereignty."2
At the principle level, Rousseau categorically rejects
the idea that sovereignty could be represented: "la
souverainete n'etant que I'exercice de la volonte^ generale, ne 
peut jamais s'allener.
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et que le souverain, qui n'est q u 'un
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etre collectif, ne peut etre represente que par lui-meme; le 
pouvoir peut blen se transmettre, mais non pas la volonte” 
(CS, O.C., III» 368). This does not mean that Rousseau rejects
representative government in general, as Ellenburg seems to be 
saying: "Rousseau's hostility to the very idea of
representative government is a final, direct instance of his 
anarchistic imperative, for his concern was not the scope, 
responsibility, or accountability of representative political 
authority, but the division between those who command and
those who obey."3 on the contrary, Rousseau accepts, even
insists upon, representative government. Rousseau's rejection 
of the idea that the sovereignty of the people could be
represented in its legislative authority and his acceptance of 
representative government are based on his concept of law. 
Indeed, Rousseau writes in Du Contrat social: "La Loi n'etant
que la declaration de la volonte ge'ne'rale, 11 est clalre que 
dans la puissance Legislative le Peuple ne peut etre
represente; mais 11 peut et doit I'etre dans la puissance
executive, qui n'est que la force appllquee a la Loi" (O.C., 
III, 430).4 The essence of government consists in executing
existing general laws by applying them to particular cases.
Therefore, its role is to represent the sovereign in this 
specific function.
In order to understand thoroughly the relation between 
government and sovereignty it is necessary to know two aspects 
of law. The one aspect is related to the essence of the 
sovereign people that acts through the general laws,3 and the
other aspect to the essence of
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the same 
Rous seau
the government that executes 
laws by applying them to particular circumstances, 
explains in Lettres ecrites de la Montagne;
La Loi ne peut par sa nature avoir un objet particulier 
et individual: mais 1'app1ication de la Loi tombe sur
des objets particuliers et individuals.
Le pouvoir Legislatif qui est le Souverain a done 
besoin d *un autre pouvoir qui execute, c 'est-a-dire, 
qui reduise la Loi en actes particuliers. Ce second 
pouvoir doit etre etabli de maniere qu'il execute 
toujours la Loi, et qu'il n'execute jamais que la Loi. 
Ici vlent I'lnstltution du Gouvernement" (O.C., III, 
8 0 8) .
This means that government, being the sovereign people's 
commissioner, has no Independent ground to legitimate its 
power. By this, however, the government is not made
insignificant, because if it is taken at its proper realm, it 
is indispensable and the Body politic could not exist as it 
should without delegating the application of laws to the 
government. Otherwise, it risks falling into either anarchy or 
des pot ism.
In Rousseau's political context to ask whether he accepts 
representative government or not is misleading, because 
legislative authority is not included in his concept of 
government. Therefore, the right question to ask is whether
or not Rousseau accepts representative democracy concerning 
the legislative authority. In his Considerations sur le
gouvernement de Pologne, Rousseau seems to accept the idea of 
representative democracy, because of the large size of the 
country where it is impossible for the people to exercise
its sovereignty. This question is treated in the 
seventh chapter of his Considerations. under a significant 
title: "Moyens de maintenir la constitution" (O.C., H I ,  975).
Rousseau acknowledges the difficulty of exercising 
sovereignty directly by the people in large states. For this 
reason, he accepts representative democracy at the practical 
level, but without renouncing his fundamental position at the 
principle level. In his Considerations. Rousseau remarks:
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Un de plus grands inconveniens des grands Etats, celui 
de tous qui y rend la liberte le plus difficile a 
conserver, est que la puissance legislative ne peut s'y 
montrer elle-meme, et ne peut agir que par deputation. 
Cela a son mal et son bien, mais le mal I'emporte. Le 
Legislateur en corps est impossible a corrompre, mais 
facile a tromper. Ses representans sont diffici1ement 
trompes, mais aisement corrompus, et il arrive rarement 
qu'ils ne le soient pas. Vous avez sous les yeux 
I'exemple du Parlement d 'Ang1eterre, et par le 1iberum 
veto celui de votre propre nation (O.C., III, 978-979).
To prevent this danger of corruption and disloyalty, Rousseau 
proposes two measures or remedies, one against corruption and 
another for the revocation of representatives in case they do 
not follow the instructions of their constituents:
Le premier est . . . la fre'quence des Dietes, qui
changeant souvent les representans, rend leur seduction 
plus couteuse et plus difficile . . .  Le second moyen
est d'assujetir les representans a suivre exactement
leurs instructions et a rendre un compte severe a leurs 
constituans de leur conduite a la Diete. (O.C., III, 
979)
Thereby, Rousseau does not accept any kind of
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democracy such as the Parliament of England, in the sense that 
the representatives are independent from their constituents 
for determined years in the lawmaking process. On the 
contrary, by positing these two measures, i.e. by 
subordinating representatives to their constituents, Rousseau 
tries to reconcile the representative system with his concept 
of sovereignty. Rousseau clearly expresses:
II faut q u 'a chaque mot que le Nonce dit a la Diete, a 
chaque demarche qu'il fait, il se voye d'avance sous 
les yeux de ses constituans, et qu'il sente I'influence 
qu'aura leur jugement tant sur ses projets d'avancement 
que sur I'estime de ses compatriotes, indispensable 
pour leur execution: car enfln ce n'est pas pour y dire
leur sentiment partlculier, mals pour y declarer les 
volontes de la Nation qu'elle envole des Nonces a la 
Diete. Ce frein est absolument necessaire pour les 
contenir dans leur devoir et prevenir toute corruption, 
de quelque part qu'elle vienne. (O.C., III, 980)
Then, according to Rousseau, the representative's mission does 
not reside in expressing his own conscience and his 
independent judgment, but the expressed will of his
constituents. Given the subject matter to treat, Rousseau does 
not question the feasibility of this kind of representation:
t '•"Quol q u 'on en pulsse dire, je ne vois aucun inconvenient a 
cette gene, puisque la chambre des Nonces n'ayant ou ne devant 
avoir aucune part au detail de 1'adminlstrat ion, ne peut 
jamais avoir a tralter aucune matiere imprevue" (O.C., III, 
980) .
It is consequently difficult to understand the problem 
raised by Richard Fralin: "If the principles of the Contrat
were really his guide, why, having already conceded the
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necessity for representative government, would he not Insist 
on reforming the Polish system of representation to make it 
as compatible as possible with the principles of the Contrat 
• • Because as Derathe points out, Rousseau is doing
exactly that. "Ce texte,” says Derathe, ”est en parfalt accord 
avec les prlnclpes du Contrat social, pulsque les instructions 
des Nonces en font de simples 'commissaires' du peuple, et 
q u ' on ne leur lalsse aucune initiative en matlere 
1egis1ative . "7 Furthermore, Derathe states, [Rousseau]
etait . . .  pret a assoupllr ses principes pour les 
rendre appllcables aux grands Etats modernes. En 
particulier, au lieu d'ecarter systemat1quement le 
gouvernement representat 1 f , 11 se seralt contente^ de le
reformer. Dans son esprit, le systeme des mandats 
imperatlfs devalt sufflre a malntenir, dans le cadre du
regime representatif, la souverainete reelle du 
peuple.8
Therefore, for Derathe, there is no Inconsistency or 
discrepancy between Rousseau's theoretical principles in Du 
Contrat social and his political realism in the Considerations 
sur 1e gouvernement de Po1ogne. Thus, Rousseau has no 
difficulty in accepting representative democracy on the 
condition that the delegates reflect the will of their 
constituents by following their instructions. In this, the 
essence of democracy remains intact, because of the 
subordination of the delegates to their constituents. Rousseau 
condemns representative democracy in which the
are considered as Independent from their constituents, in the
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sense that they legislate according to their conscience and 
their judgments.
Rousseau accepts a representative democracy in which 
delegates represent the views and Interests of their 
constituents. Given the size of the country, Rousseau reasons, 
the people could not participate directly; then those supposed 
to represent them must be loyal to them. Accordingly, in the 
last analysis, for Rousseau, the guiding principle remains the 
concept of participation rather than that of representation.9
In order to understand these two different meanings of 
representation, it is Important to take note of Derathe's 
remark concerning the meaning of election in Rousseau and in 
Stuart Mill:
Rousseau consldere que les elections ont pour but de
permettre au peuple de declarer ses volontes et des les 
tradulre sous forme de lols dans les assemblees
par 1ementaires; c'est pourquol les deputes ne peuvent
et ne dolvent etre que de simples del^gue'^s, "asservls a 
leurs instructions." Stuart Mill, comme Montesquieu, 
voit dans les elections un moyen de designer des
personna1ites capables de legiferer. II s'agit done 
avant tout de falre conflance a des horomes d 'une valeur 
eprouvee et de leur lalsser la plus grande initiative
dans leur mission de leglslateurs et leur tache de
gouvernants. 10
Here, gros so m o d o . we have
representative as trustee,
representative democracy is 
accepts or rejects it; two
two concepts of representation: in
as delegate, in the other 
Therefore, the question concerning 
not simply whether or not Rousseau 
different roles of representatives
mu s t first be qualified. The representative as trustee relies
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on his own conscience and his independent judgment due to his 
expertise in the subject matter in determining what is the 
best interest of the nation and his constituents- This type of 
democracy is based on the primacy of reason. The
representative as delegate relies on the will of his
constituents rather than on his own judgment, because the 
criterion is not placed on the wisdom of the delegate, but on 
the assumption that he represents the vote of his constituents 
if they had the opportunity to participate themselves. This 
model of democracy is based on the primacy of the will. 
Indeed, there is a great difference between to authorize 
someone to will for us and to authorize someone to execute our 
will given the circumstantial impossibilities.
Given the above distinction, we can affirm not only that 
Rousseau accepts representative democracy in the sense that 
the people's representatives in the Parliament reflect the 
will of their constituents, but also, in limited cases, that 
he accepts the initiative of a delegate in the subject matters 
not forseen by his constituents. About these specific limited 
cases, Rousseau writes: "pourvu q u 'un nonce ne fasse rien de
contraire a I'expresse volonte de ses constituans, ils ne lui 
feroient pas un crime d'avoir opine en bon citoyen sur une 
matiere qu'ils n'auroient pas prevue, et sur laquelle ils 
n'auroient rien determine” (Considerations. O.C., III, 980).
In subject matters where the will of constituents is
expressed, delegates who do not execute these instructions
should be recalled, even punished:
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Qu'elles [les Dletlnes] punissent leurs nonces, que 
s'il le faut elles leur fassent nieme couper la tete 
quand ils ont prevarique: mais qu'elles obeissent
pleinement, toujours, sans exception, sans
protestation, qu'elles portent comme il est juste la
peine de leur mauvais choix; sauf a faire a la
prochaine Diete, si elles le jugent a propos, des
representations aussi vives qu'il leur plalra.
(Considerations, O.C., III, 980-981)
So, by reconciling the conflict between the jurisdiction of 
the Dletlnes and the Diet, Rousseau shows how to preserve the 
constitution and the unity of the country, even going against 
his doctrine that "toute loi que le peuple en personne n'a pas 
ratifiee est nulle; ce n'est point une loi" (CS, O.C., III, 
430). But, essentially, as in the relation between sovereignty 
and government, in the relation between the sovereign people 
and their delegate, the delegate like the government plays the 
role of the commissioner on behalf of the sovereign people. 
Cobban sums up this apparent political paradox: "In the 
Gouvernement de Pologne he [Rousseau] . . .  relaxes his ban 
against representation, which he is now willing to accept, so 
long as there are frequent diets and the representatives are 
strictly compelled to follow the Instructions of their 
constituents; they are left free, moreover, to decide for 
themselves any unanticipated question which may arise."11
Therefore, the acceptance of representative democracy, 
due to physical or technical impossibility, does not make 
invalid Rousseau's guiding principle of participation. 
Otherwise, Rousseau must deny that the law is the expression 
of the general will and thereby he must accept the transfer 
theory, according to which sovereignty is transferable from
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the people to the ruler or representative. In this case, 
Rousseau's emphasis on the subordination of the delegate to 
his constituents becomes sheer nonsense.
Given this context, now, we will analyse Rousseau's 
acceptance of "representative government" expressed by Fralin, 
in his article entitled "The Evolution of Rousseau's View of 
ive Government" ( 19 7 8):
Rousseau's view of representation was thus ambivalent 
throughout his political writings. On the one hand, he 
insisted that each citizen take an active part in the 
political process, particularly in the legislative 
process, which he considered the heart of every
political system. In the Cont rat he went so far as to 
declare void any law which the citizenry had not 
personally approved, and even in the Considerations he 
accepted legislation by a representative body only with 
great reluctance. On the other hand, he specifically 
and repeatedly denied citizens the kinds of political 
initiatives that were essential if their participation 
in the political process was to be meaningful. His 
institutional ideal of elective aristocracy not only 
gave the executive a dominant role in legislation 
through control of the legislative initiative but also 
enabled the executive to perpetuate itself in office 
through its monopoly of nominations. In view of these 
severe restraints on the exercise of popular political 
initiatives, his distinction between executive and 
legislative representation tended to break down, and 
the force of both his theoretical and practical 
objections to representative governments was
weakened.12
Fralin forces Rousseau to accept "representative government" 
by softening his whole political system, instead of making a 
distinction between which ideas belong to the principle level 
and which to the practical level. Fralin sees some kind of 
contradiction between the participation of the citizens in 
approving or disapproving proposed laws and the active role of
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the government in initiating law. In other words, he thinks
that the participation of the sovereign people in the law
waking process could not be complete, if they are deprived
from initiating laws. Rousseau admitted equality among men
concerning their sentiments and emotions and not their reason.
Consequently, given the complexity of public affairs, the
people's right consists in the deliberative act upon the
proposals made in periodically fixed assemblies. Therefore,
the non-participation of the people in initiating law is not
in contradiction with Rousseau's thesis that will cannot be
represented in its deliberative act, and that sovereignty
belongs only to the people. There is a discrepancy between
what the people can know and will; for this reason, Rousseau
states: "il faut apprendre a I'autre [le public] a conna^tre
ce qu'il veut" (CS, O.C., III, 380). But this does not reduce
the role of the people to essentially passive and negative; on
the contrary it is active, because a sovereign people do not
obey the laws imposed by the will of others, but obey the laws
which they deliberate. Rousseau does not give the initiative
to propose fundamental laws to the people because he makes a
distinction between will and reason: "De lui-meme le peuple
veut toujours le bien, mais de lui-meme il ne le voit pas
toujours. La volonte generale est toujours droite, mais le
^ /jugement qui la guide n'est pas toujours eclaire" (CS, O.C., 
III, 380). This does not lead him to the theory of elitism,
although Rousseau appeals to the Lawgiver to enlighten the
people; on the contrary, as Werner Bahner exactly remarks:
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"Rousseau n'est pas convaincu que la totalite^ des assocle's, le
peuple en corps, opte selon les principes de la raison, et il
^ / / s'adresse a un sage comme legislateur. La legislation n'est
pas pour cela une affaire d 'une elite, d ' un groupe
d 'Inte11ectuels . Elle dolt etre approuvee par le peuple
souverain."13 gy this, Rousseau prefers the sovereign people
in need of being enlightened rather than people guided by
enlightened despot.
However, to say that Rousseau was harsh with 
representative democracy because he had no experience with the 
parliamentary democracy of our time does not help us in 
understanding the essence of democracy in Rousseau's political 
theory. Rousseau's doctrine of sovereignty is grounded on the 
democratic principle of self-determination in which the people 
are educated morally and politically. J.G. Merqulor is right 
in saying:
The core of Rousseau's theory of political legitimacy 
is the idea of participatory democracy. The general 
will is to be always activated by constant Individual 
participation in the politics of sovereignty. . . .
In Rousseau's eyes, egalitarian participation has two 
Invaluable attributes. First, it secures a permanent 
control of power. Second, it is educative, in that it 
develops autonomous and responsible social action on 
the part of the individual.1A
In representative democracy, legislation being the expression 
of the general will, the sovereign people do not abdicate 
their rights but try to exercise them through intermediaries.
given the cicumstances.
The problem of democratic
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representation remains under 
discussion in the twentieth century. Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), 
a well known legal philosopher, writes that "there can be no 
doubt that . . .  none of the existing democracies called 
’representative' are really representative."15 According to 
Kelsen, to state that the member of parliament represents the 
people as a whole, and therefore the people are the legislator 
is a political fiction.16 Political writers who insist on 
representative democracy "do not present a scientific theory 
but advocate a political ideology."17 Although Kelsen does not 
specifically mention Rousseau, his explanation of the true 
sense of representation seems to us very close to Rousseau's 
concept of the representative system:
In order to establish a true relationship of 
representation, it is not sufficient that the 
representative be appointed or elected by the 
represented. It is necessary that the representative
be legally obliged to execute the will of the 
represented, and that the fulfillment of this 
obligation be legally guaranteed. The typical
guarantee is the power of the represented to recall the
representative in case the latter's activity does 
conform with the former's wishes.18
not
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Chapter V 
The Natural Law
The criticism concerning Rousseau's natural law theory 
follows the line of the controversy over individualism versus 
collectivism. Vaughan praises Rousseau's intellectual honesty 
in rejecting natural law:
The argument is a striking proof of Rousseau's 
originality. The idea of natural Law had held the field 
since the days of the Roman Jurists. With the political 
philosophers of more recent times, it had been a 
commonplace since the days of Hooker and Grotius. None 
of them save Hobbes and Spinoza— the latter far more 
completely than the former— had escaped its tyranny. 
The authority of Locke had given it a new sanction. And 
even apart from the almost unbroken tradition in its 
favour, there was much in it that could not but appeal 
strongly to the spirit of Rousseau. It is therefore the 
clearest proof both of his speculative genius and of 
his Intellectual honesty that he should have decisively 
rejected it . 1
Derathe denies that Rousseau abandoned the natural law 
theory. In order to show the right place of natural theory in 
Rousseau's political thinking, Derathe takes into
consideration the importance of Rousseau's thesis of gradual 
evolution of humankind on the one hand, and his distinction 
between natural law in the state of nature and in civil
society, on the other. He writes that
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Rousseau n 'a . . .  pas renonce au droit natural. Tous 
ses efforts tendent au contraire a montrer que le droit
nature! exi s t e dans I'etat de nature et qu'il subs i ste 
dans la societe civile. Mais tandis que ses 
predecesseurs se font du droit nature! une notion 
unique et admettent que le droit de la nature et celui 
de la raison ne font qu'un, Rousseau est amene' a faire
une distinction entre le droit nature! primitif.
anterieur la raison et le droit nature! retabli par
la raison. En passant de I'etat de nature a I'etat 
civil, le droit naturel subit la meme metamorphose que
1'homme auquel il s'applique. Dans I'etat de nature, il
n'etait qu'instinct et bonte, dans I'etat civil il 
devient justice et raison.2
On this subject, we will follow Derathe's position, because we
think that it conforms to Rousseau's true thought.
Rousseau's approach to natural law is very original and
methodical, at least in comparison with that of his 
contemporaries. Indeed, since he sees clearly the ambiguity 
inherent in the expression of "natural law" itself, he is able 
to identify the source of misunderstanding that separated the
ancients from the moderns in defining natural law. Rousseau 
criticized both positions as incomplete and thereby accepts 
and rejects both according to the different levels of his 
evolutionary theory of humankind. Therefore, Rousseau's 
approach differs, generally speaking, from the ancients who 
equate natural law with the law of nature and from the moderns 
who equate it with the law of reason only.
One of Rousseau's merits in this subject consists in 
clarifying the ambiguity involved in the expression of natural 
law. For natural law, Rousseau states, to be law "il faut que 
la volonte de celui qu'elle oblige puisse s'y soumettre avec
connoissance," and to be natural, "il faut . . .  qu'elle parle
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immediatement par la voix de la Nature” (Inegali te . O.C., III,
125). Therefore, when we speak about natural law, if the 
emphasis is put on the word "law," natural law necessarily 
presupposes reason and society; accordingly it is logical that 
natural law could be interpreted as the law inherent only in a 
rational being; on the other hand, if the emphasis is put on 
the word "natural," natural law does not necessarily 
presuppose reason and society; instead it exists prior to 
reason and society, and accordingly it is better understood as 
the law Inherent in all living beings. The first position is 
concerned with knowledge of the natural law, and the second 
with its existence. In the context of the evolutionary theory 
of humankind, such as Rousseau's, existence and knowledge of 
natural law are not necessarily considered to be coeval.
Two definitions that characterize these two extreme
attitudes are worth quoting. Ulplan (d. 228 A.D.), Roman
jurisconsult, among the ancients, defines natural law (jus 
naturale) as "quod natura omnia animalla docuit."^ Samuel 
Pufendorf (1632-94), among the moderns, defines natural law 
(la loi naturelle) as "celle qui convient si necessalrement a 
la nature raisonnable et sociable de 1'homme, que sans 
1'observation de cette loi 11 ne saurolt y avoir parmi le 
genre humain de societe honnete et palslble."5
When Rousseau speaks about the confusion in understanding 
natural law made by the moderns and the ancients, it seems 
that he has in mind these two extreme attitudes. Rousseau
clearly writes:
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Sans parler des Anciens Philosophes qui semblent avoir 
pris a tache de se contredire entre eux sur les 
principes les plus fondamentaux, les Jur1sconsu1tes 
Romains assujett1ssent indifferemment 1'homme et tous 
les autres anlmaux a la meme Loy naturelle, parce 
q u ’ils considerent plutot sous ce nom la Loy que la 
Nature s'lmpose a elle meme, que celle qu'elle
prescrit; ou plutot, a cause de I ’acception
particuliere selon laquelle ces Jurisconsu1tes
entendent le mot de Loy qu'lls semblent n'avoir pris en 
cette occasion que pour I'expression des rapports 
generaux etablis par la nature entre tous les etres 
animes, pour leur commune conservation. Les Modernes ne 
reconnoissant sous le nom de Loy q u 'une regie prescrite 
a un etre moral, c'est-a-dire intelligent, libre, et 
considere dans ses rapports avec d'autres etres,
bornent consequemment au seul animal doue de raison, 
c'est-a-dire a 1'homme, la competence de la Loy 
naturelle. (Inegali t e . O.C., III, 124-125)
This opposition, according to Rousseau, comes mainly from 
ignorance concerning human nature and the disagreement
concerning the meaning of law. Rousseau not only criticizes 
his predecessors but also gives his own solution by
transcending the one-sided position of these two extreme 
attitudes held by the ancients and the moderns. Rousseau, on
the one hand, disagrees with the definition of the moderns,
because for primitive man, in the state of nature lacking the 
use of reason, natural law could not be a precept or rule 
prescribed by nature to a rational being and discernible by 
right reason. He also disagrees with the definition of the 
ancients, because in the state of civil society, man, being 
rational, participates in natural law through his reason. At 
this level, man does not follow natural law by natural 
inclination only; instead he follows it by recognition and
c o n s c i e n c e .  On the o th er hand R o u s s e a u  agr ee s w i t h  the
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ancients in affirming that man, as a sensitive being, shares 
natural law with all living beings, especially with the 
animals. Within this context, natural law is better understood 
as a rule imposed by nature to all living beings. Rousseau 
agrees with the moderns in affirming that man participates in 
natural law according to his specific nature as a rational 
being. Therefore, in the state of civil society, natural law 
can be better understood as a rule prescribed to a rational 
being.
By showing that natural law varies in the state of nature
and in civil society, Rousseau conserves the definition of the
ancients for man in the state of nature and of the moderns for
man in civil socity. Therefore, these two attitudes concerning
natural law, for Rousseau, are not two fragmented absolutes 
that mutually exclude each other. With this, however, we are 
not saying that the ambiguity concerning natural law has found 
a definitive solution in Rousseau's philosophy. In modern 
philosophy, the notion of nature is reduced to the notion of 
matter, and the notion of reason is ambiguous, because of the
controversy concerning the relation between passion and 
reason. If passion determines what is natural in man, reason
becomes an instrument of passion; then natural law is 
essentially the law of passion. On the contrary, if reason 
determines what is natural in man, passion becomes a servant 
of reason; then natural law is essentially the law of reason.
The first position prevails in the extreme empiricist context
such as in David Hume; the second in rationalist philosophy
where, generally, man is defined by his reason or soul. The
position of Rousseau seems similar to the second, even though
he uses terms like "conscience" and "sentiment." Rousseau has
great merit, at least, in offering a satisfactory solution to 
the controversy created by modern thinkers who conceive nature
and law as two concepts mutually exclusive. In fact, in modern
philosophy, the meaning of nature is reduced to the meaning of
inert matter or to the sum total of phenomena. For this 
reason, nature could not have a normative value as it had in
Greek and medieval thought. For this same reason the concept 
of cosmology has been replaced by mechanical physics.6 Given 
the above change in the meaning of nature, modern 
philosophers, contrary to the ancients, reduced the sense of 
natural law to moral law. In this specific case, if we try to
understand Rousseau's position by putting him in the modern 
context, we arrive at the logical conclusion that there could
be no natural law in Rousseau's state of nature.
Natural law, in the state of nature, according to 
Rousseau, is a law derived from the combination of self-love
and pity.7 These two qualities are common to man and to the 
animals and exist prior to reason. The source of this law, at
this stage, are the instincts of self-preservation and natural 
goodness imprinted by nature or by the author of nature in the 
human heart rather than in his reason. According to Jean 
Starobinski, specialist in eighteenth century culture
"L'amour de soi et la pitie sont les mouvements spontanes de
la sensibilite qui fondent la morale naturelle."8
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Natural 1 aw in the state of civil
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purpose, but now it 
rather than in natural
society, has the same 
has its source in reason and conscience 
spontaneity. As Starobinski points out:
Une fois perdu I'etat de nature, cette spontaneite 
dispara'itra : c'est par le recours au raisonnement que
1'on formulera les regies de la moralite, destinees a 
corriger I'erreur a laquelle 1'homme est desormais 
expose. Quoique la loi morale ne contredise nullement
le droit naturel, elle doit neanmoihs etre e^difiee "sur
d'autres fondements” .9
The important thing to underline here is that the
distinction between natural law in the state of nature and in 
the state of civil society does not concern its end, but its 
source. In fact, to quote again Starobinski: "les motivations
raisonnables, les imperatifs du sentiment moral visent au meme 
but (conservation de sol, respect de la vie d'autrui) que le
mouvement spontane de la nature. Le droit n'aura pas change''
sa fin, mais dans sa source . " 10
Therefore, Rousseau does not reject natural 1a w , as
Vaughan and others think, but he reformulates it in order to 
fit the condition of man in the state of nature and in the 
state of civil society. Given this reformulation, Rousseau 
clarifies his position:
De cette maniere, on n'est point oblige de faire de 
1'homme un Philosophe avant que d 'en faire un homme; 
ses devoirs envers autrui ne lui sont pas uniquement 
dlctes par les tardlves lemons de la Sagesse; et tant 
qu'il ne resistera point a I'impulsion interieure de la
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commiseration, 11 ne fera jamais du mal a un autre 
homme, ni meme a aucun etre sensible, except^ dans le 
cas legitime ou sa conservation se trouvant Interesse'e, 
11 est oblige de se donner la prefe^rence a lui-meme. 
(Inegallte. O.C., III, 126)
Natural man, being only asocial in the state of nature, 
becomes a social being only with the concurrence of external
factors actualizing his virtual potentialities. Under the 
tension or conflict between amour-propre and pity, his reason
and conscience become awakened. This development or historical 
evolution is not in contradiction with Rousseau's concept of 
man, because natural man, besides those two qualities, was 
also endowed with the quality of perfectibility, the only 
quality that distinguishes him from other animals. At a later
stage of his evolution conscience and reason become the source
of natural law understood as moral law or law prescribed to 
the rational being.
The understanding of this historical development of man, 
from the primitive state to civil society, helps us to see the
transformation of natural law by inclination to natural law by 
reason. But this transformation of natural law concerns the
source and not the end.
One of the sources of misunderstanding about Rousseau's
natural law doctrine consists in taking the word of law and
the word of nature as two concepts mutually exclusive and then 
in equating the concept of law with that of reason. Marc F. 
Plattner, for example, denies the possibility of natural law
in Rousseau's thought:
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According to Rousseau, nature and law are mutually 
exclusive (the one belongs to the realm of physics, and 
the other to the realm of morality). Law can speak only 
to a being that possesses Intelligence and moral 
liberty. But by nature man does not possess 
Intelligence and moral liberty. Therefore nature cannot 
speak to man's reason, but only to the passions which 
he shares with the lower animals. Nature can only 
Impose; It cannot prescribe. In short, according to 
Rousseau's own criteria, properly speaking there can be 
no natural law.11
From this statement, he draws another conclusion which Is 
based on comparlslon of natural man with animals. Natural man, 
being "by nature devoid of reason," like animals, "cannot be 
subject to natural law any more than are the other animals —  
and thus there can be no natural law."12 x q  support this 
Interpretation, Plattner quotes the following passage from
Rousseau's Second Dlscours "For It Is clear that, being
devoid of Intellect and of freedom, they [animals] cannot
recognize this law [natural law]."13 This qoutatlon can have 
Plattner's meaning. If and only If we equate the concept of
law with the concept of reason. Otherwise, Rousseau Is not 
saying that animals are not subjected to or do not participate 
In natural law but simply that animals "cannot recognize" It.
In fact, Rousseau Is clear on this subject, because he adds:
"Mals tenant en quelque chose a notre nature par la 
senslblllte^ dont 11s sont doues, on jugera qu'lls dolvent 
aussl partlclper au droit naturel, et que 1'homme est 
assujettl envers eux a quelque esp^ce de devoirs" (Ineeallte. 
O.C., III, 126).!^ According to this passage, Rousseau Is
saying that animals must also participate in natural law. For
him, there can be no contradiction in stating that the savage, 
like animals, is subject to natural law without having 
adequate knowledge of it, i.e by natural inclination. We think 
that this interpretation conforms to Rousseau's philosophy.
It is necessary always to have in mind the two types of 
natural law unequivocally expressed by Rousseau himself. The 
first is of instinctive origin, what Rouusseu calls "droit 
nature! proprement dit" (CS [lere version], O.C., III, 329). 
This law is applicable, at least, to all sensitive beings, man 
included; it concerns essentially their self-preservation, the 
propagation and preservation of the species. The second type 
is called "droit naturel raisonne" (CS [lere version], O.C., 
III, 329). This law appears with the development of human 
reason and society, and is known as law prescribed to a 
rational being and discernible by right reason.
These two aspects of natural law are rightly expressed by 
Derathe:
Rousseau affirme justement que le droit naturel peut se
presenter sous deux aspects bien differents selon qu'il 
s'appllque a I'etat de nature ou a la societe civile. 
Dans I'etat de nature, les regies du droit naturel ont 
leur fondement dans des "principes anterieures a la 
raison," c'est seulement au sein de I'etat civil 
qu'elles deviennent les maxlmes de la droite raison. En
d'autres termes, 11 y a deux especes de droit naturel; 
1'u n , s e cundum mot u s sensualitatis, c'est le "droit 
naturel proprement dit," celui qui convient a I'etat de
nature, I'autre, secundum mo t u s rat ionls, ou "droit 
naturel raisonne," n'apparait qu'apres 1'etab1issement
des societes civiles.l5
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According to Derath^, the denial of natural law in the state 
of nature would be true, only on one condition: "si le droit 
naturel etait seulement le droit de la raison."16 But, as 
Derathe points out, this equation is far from being in 
conformity with Rousseau's expressed position. As we saw 
above, these two kinds of natural law are not two separate 
laws, in the sense that one has nothing to do with the other. 
In fact, the first type of natural law is not abolished in 
civil society; instead it subsists in it through the 
transformation of the instinct of self-preservation and 
natural goodness to the principles of reason and justice. The 
transformation, then, does not concern the end of natural law, 
but its source by which it is recognized and applied.17
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Cone 1us ion
From what has been said, we recognize that Rousseau's 
political theory is complex, because of many distinctions to
make in regard to his main concept s . Our re ad 1 ng of his
po1i 11ca1 writ i ng s convinced u s that Rousseau i s not an
ext r emi s t . On the contrary, he is a moderate who prefers
always an intermediary position between two extreme thoughts. 
In this, his consistency is striking.
In his Dlscours sur I'inegalite^. Rousseau stands for an 
Intermediary stage between the primitive and the civilized 
states of m a n :
quoique les hommes fussent devenus moins endurans, et
que la pitie naturelle eut deja souffert quelque 
alteration, ce periode du developpement des facultes 
humaines, tenant un juste milieu entre I'indolence de 
I'etat primitif et la petulante activite de notre amour 
propre, dut etre 1'epoque la plus heureuse, et la plus
durable. (O.C., III, 171)
Equally, concerning language, as J. Starobinski pointed out, 
Rousseau prefers the spoken language of the patriarchal 
society which is "entre la langue grossiere de la horde et la
langue extenue^e des civilises."!
In Du Contrat social, we have seen that Rousseau, at the
principle level, stands for democracy, which is an 
intermediary position between anarchy and despotism; and, at 
the practical level, for elective aristocracy, which is an 
intermediary position between democracy and monarchy.
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/In his Considerations sur le Rouvernement de Pologne, his
between Hobbes' idea of representative that abolishes the 
represented and Locke's idea of representative as trustee.
Rousseau's concept of democracy is rooted in the right of
voting of the people, but especially in the free expression of
their opinions. For this the ideal political unit is the small
city state (but not so small that it could not defend Itself
and be self-sufficient) in which the people could interact 
face-to— face and meet in a general assembly to discuss and 
deliberate on legislative matters. Indeed, as Rousseau 
indicated in describing the Parliament of England, the right
of voting alone does not reflect participatory democracy. 
Instead, in England the electoral process excludes the people 
from politics: "Le peuple Anglols pense etre libre; il se
trompe fort, il ne I'est que durant I'election des membres du
Parlement; sltot qu'ils sont elus, il est esclave, il n'est 
rien. Dans les courts momens de sa liberte, I'usage qu'il en
fait merite bien qu'il la perde" (CS, O.C., III, 430). For 
this reason, in Du Contrat social. Rousseau rejects 
representative democracy in a small city state, because the 
right of the people to speak, to discuss and to express 
opinions and emotions is his idea of democracy. To this end, 
since people can discuss and deliberate only if they meet each
other as equals and free, Rousseau recommends a moderate 
economic equality.2
idea of as delegate takes an intermediary place
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Another striking point to mention is that Rousseau was 
always firm concerning principles, but flexible concerning 
their applications. He affirmed through his political writings 
that sovereignty resides and remains in the hands of the 
people, and advocated that the people's legislative right 
could not be represented or transferred. But, on the practical 
level, Rousseau accepted the idea of representative as 
delegate in large states; in a small city state, concerning 
the legislative process, Rousseau made practical his theory of 
sovereignty by giving the right to initiate law to the 
executive power and the right to approve or disapprove the 
proposals after deliberation to the sovereign people. By 
carefully defining each role, Rousseau avoids the danger of 
anarchy and despotism.
The difficulty of understanding Rousseau's political 
thinking, then, comes from his intermediary position that 
tries to maintain a state of equilibrium between two extreme 
thoughts. From Rousseau's perspective the controversy over 
individualism versus collectivism, or totalitarianism versus 
liberalism in political theory could be better understood as a 
product of a loss of equilibrium. Rousseau was fully aware of 
the difficulty and the necessity to maintain a balance where 
he treats the relation between sovereignty and government, 
government and the people as subjects:
Le Gouvernement rejoit du Souverain les ordres qu'il 
donne au peuple, et pour que I'Etat solt dans un bon 
equillbre il faut, tout compense, qu'il y ait egalite 
entre le produit ou la puissance du Gouvernement pris
9 1
en lui-meme et le produit ou la puissance des citoyens, 
qui sont souverains d ’un cote et sujets de I'autre. 
(CS, O.C., III, 396)
According to Rousseau, from the destruction of the balance 
between these three terms follows anarchism or despotism which
are the signs of the degeneration of the body politic.
Hence, the concept of equilibrium or balance is very 
important in understanding Rousseau's political thinking. But 
Rousseau was convinced that to maintain the state of balance 
which is necessary to good politics is not easy. The balance 
could be broken at any time. This is why Rousseau praises 
virtue and adds to the constitution some institutional 
supports such as censorship and civil religion to maintain 
the balance within the body politic, and, a tribunate and 
dictatorship to correct it when it is at a critical point.
In conclusion, we can state that the various and 
important problems Rousseau raised make him our contemporary, 
because he, better than other philosophes, had an advantage to
be in the Eighteenth Century without being of it. The
actualite of Rousseau's impact on pedagogy, philosophy, 
sociology, theology, anthropology, and political theory is 
appropriately reflected in the title of the commemorative 
Rousseau issue of Daedalus in the bicentennial year 1978:
Rousseau for our time.
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